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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 7 and 8, 2014, the Globe presented a one and a half day
symposium on Injury as Cultural Practice. The symposium featured
interdisciplinary panels of social scientists, social theorists and lawyers
discussing the topic, injury in cultural perspective. The purpose of the
symposium was to begin a dialogue around how the meaning of legal injury is
constructed through social and cultural practices. The premise of the symposium
was that, while the requirement of an injury is fundamental to many civil actions
in most countries of the world, the meaning of injury is constructed by cultural
and social practices and not by law alone.
The concept of an injury arises from prevalent understandings of the person,
the aspects of human beings that are considered fundamental to their identity and
worthy of legal protection. But understandings of the person vary widely across
time and space; the law reflects these variations and, at times, produces them.
The symposium addressed some of the most difficult and important debates over
injury now taking place in societies around the world. Issues included the tension
between physical and reputational injuries, relational and emotional harms,
virtual injuries, the normalization and inequitable infliction of injury on
vulnerable victims, the hidden issues of causation, and the paradoxical
degradation of victims through legal actions meant to compensate them for their
disabilities.
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Participants included social scientists as well as lawyers, and the subject
matter extended to Europe and Asia as well as North America.
The following are edited versions of the transcripts from the conference
panel discussions. The materials are grouped into three sections. Each section
explores one aspect of the general conference theme of “Injury as Cultural
Practice” as considered during the symposium proceedings. On the first day of
the proceedings, the first panel discussed “What Counts as an Injury?” The next
panel examined “Injury Narratives.” The symposium participants then heard
from Michael McCann, Professor of Political Science and Gordon Hirabayashi
Professor for the Advancement of Citizenship at University of Washington, who
served as Rapporteur after the panel discussions on both days of the symposium.
The participants then heard again from Professor McCann, as Rapporteur.
II. WHAT COUNTS AS AN INJURY
Mary Anne Franks, Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami.
Sagit Mor, Assistant Professor of Law, Haifa University Faculty of Law,
Haifa, Israel.
Samantha Barbas, Associate Professor of Law, SUNY Buffalo Law School.
Anne Bloom, Professor of Law, University of the Pacific McGeorge School
of Law.
Marc Galanter, Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law
School.
David Engel, Professor of Law, SUNY Buffalo Law School.
Gowri Ramachandran, Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School.
Mary Anne Franks, Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School
of Law. Injury Inequality.
FRANKS:
...
The particular focus that I have is what I’m calling “injury inequality.”
That’s a concept that is pretty obvious, I think, in some ways. But I think in other
ways it’s so obvious that we need to unpack it and see what kind of influence it’s
actually serving in many different contexts, in both law and society.
What I mean by “injury inequality” is basically this—that the kinds of
injuries that are perceived as, or in fact do affect, more powerful members of
society tend to be overstated. They tend to be exaggerated. They tend to be front
and center of a lot of cultural and social states. Whereas the types of injuries that
do in fact happen to more marginalized populations, disfavored populations, tend
1
to be devalued and tend to be somewhat marginalized.

1. For an example of this premise, see Mary Anne Franks, More Thoughts on the Dangerous Fragility of
Men, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Mar. 4, 2013), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/03/more-thoughtson-the-dangerous-fragility-of-men.html.
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I think this is harmful not only because this means that we’re going to have a
kind of an inefficient allocation of social and legal resources toward addressing
the injuries of the powerful. But also that it sends really terrible messages in
some cases. About what really counts as genuine harm and what does not count
as genuine harm.
I’m also concerned with the fact that if the people with the most power
engage in these types of practices where they overstate injuries to themselves and
understate injuries to each other, they set certain norms and practices and norms
and habits for everyone else that are going to be somewhat hostile to the idea of
empathy and compassion to those who actually do experience more injuries more
2
of the time.
I’m concerned about these legal and social practices that might reinforce
what we might call “status quo allocation” of risks, burdens, and benefits. Not
just in the strict legal sense, although that is part of it, but also in a social sense.
These are going to send certain messages and enforce certain ideas and values
that are in fact in direct conflict with racial equality, gender equality, and class
equality.
I think there are many different categories that we could explore of injury
inequality. I have three main categories that I want to sketch out here, because
they’re the three that I have been thinking about a lot most recently. Those are
“self‑defense,” that’s the law and the rhetoric surrounding self‑defense, “free
speech,” and “sexual assault.”
The self-defense context. My argument here is that so much of the rhetoric
surrounding self‑defense, - that is the law of self‑defense and the promotion of
the idea of self‑defense, and what I consider to be the often accompanying
rhetoric of gun rights - that these really do circulate around an exaggerated sense
of threat to white male power.
Of course, this isn’t explicit in many ways. It’s not as though these laws are
being grounded in some sort of explicit call: “White men are in danger.” If you
look at the rhetoric of the NRA, if you look at the rhetoric behind the promotion
and the defense of Stand Your Ground Laws, you do see this constant sense of
3
there are good people under threats.
Those good people generally tend to look like people like George
Zimmerman or Michael Dunn, the two most famous cases to come out of the
4
Stand Your Ground context in Florida.

2. See Mary Anne Franks, The Dangerous Fragility of Men, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 28, 2013),
http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/02/the-dangerous-fragility-of-men.html.
3. See e.g., NRA, This Train Keeps a Rollin’; Castle Doctrine Sweeps America, NRA-ILA (July 28,
2006), http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/articles/2006/this-train-keeps-a-rollin%60.aspx (discussing the need
for “law abiding citizens” to be able to protect themselves when “confronted by an armed predator”).
4. For the text of the “Stand Your Ground” law, see Fla. Stat. Ann. § 776.013 (West, Westlaw through
2014 2nd Reg. Sess.).
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When you hear Wayne LaPierre talk on behalf of the NRA, many of the
things that he will say has something to do with all of the threats that people face
nowadays. Those include riots. Those include terrorists. Those include even
5
hurricanes, according to Wayne LaPierre. I’m not sure how a gun helps you in a
hurricane, but apparently there’s some way that it would.
What’s really interesting about that rhetoric is how much it capitalizes on the
notion of injury. It’s not in some ways about strength. It’s not about
acknowledging to any extent that there are in fact divisions of self‑defense.
There are differences in how we perceive people’s ability to fight back, or
the right to fight back, but that’s not really what the rhetoric focuses on. It’s
about how much we are potentially injured. There’s injury around every corner.
We have to make sure that we are well‑armed and well‑ready to take on those
types of potential injuries. What actually happens though when we see this? This
is something that’s been very much on the radar for those of us who are watching
Florida. I happen to live in Florida, so I’m there seeing it all unfold.
Of course, the first really famous Stand Your Ground case coming out of
6
Florida is the George Zimmerman case. There we have a situation where a quite
substantial person is patrolling a neighborhood with a weapon, and encounters a
young black male who is unarmed, and who we have never heard any argument
from Zimmerman that he thought he was armed. That he essentially feels that he
is out of place, and that he poses some sort of threat. He poses some sort of threat
to the neighborhood, and that entitles Zimmerman to go and confront him. Now,
as to the fallout, so what actually happens, we don’t really know. In the moments
before the gun goes off, we don’t really know what happens, because there’s only
7
one person who’s left to tell the tale, and that is Zimmerman.
The idea is that he gets to activate this notion of injury, this potential threat to
the neighborhood, in order to kill someone else. When he does that, we set up a
very interesting narrative about injury, because he is the man with a gun,
patrolling a neighborhood. Trayvon Martin is a young black man who is simply
8
trying to get home. We are meant to see this Trayvon Martin as the threat. He is
the one who can commit injury, not the one who can be injured. Therefore,
Zimmerman is entitled to use deadly force against him.
The Michael Dunn case does something very similar. For those of you who
9
are less familiar with the details of that case, this happens at a gas station.

5. Wayne LaPierre, Stand and Fight, THE DAILY CALLER (Feb. 12, 2013), http://dailycaller.com/
2013/02/13/stand-and-fight/.
6. Greg Botelho and Holly Yan, George Zimmerman Found Not Guilty of Murder in Trayvon Martin’s
Death, CNN (July 14, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/13/justice/zimmerman-trial/.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Greg Botelho, Steve Almasy, and Sunny Hostin, Dunn Convicted of Attempted Murder; Hung Jury on
Murder in “Loud Music” Trial, CNN (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/16/justice/florida-loudmusic-trial/.
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Michael Dunn is sitting in the passenger side of a car. His girlfriend goes in to
get some snacks. There is a vehicle, an SUV next to them, that’s playing very
10
loud music. He calls it “rap crap,” or something to that effect. He orders the
11
young men in the vehicle to turn the music down.
At that point, apparently they do turn the music down, but Jordan Davis, who
is a 17‑year old black man sitting in the back, apparently says something to the
12
driver about how “we don’t need to listen to him. Turn the music back up.”
There’s a kind of verbal exchange that gets very profane. At some point, what we
do know is that Michael Dunn takes out his gun from the glove compartment,
and he shoots at this vehicle. He shoots at it three or four times as the vehicle is
13
parked next to him. As the driver panics, pulls out the vehicle and starts to
14
retreat, he shoots at it another five or six times, at the same vehicle. When he is
asked why he did what he did, he says that he saw a gun, that Jordan Davis was
15
not just threatening him verbally, but also had a weapon of some kind.
The troubling thing for Michael Dunn is that there was never any evidence of
16
a weapon found. That might be due to the fact that there was not as good of an
investigation as one might have hoped. The more troubling thing for Michael
Dunn is that he never mentions a weapon to his girlfriend, not that night, not that
17
morning after he hears that Jordan Davis had died. He never mentions the
weapon until he’s been arrested, and that has now become part of his narrative of
why he used self‑defense.
There again, you have a man who is sitting in his vehicle, who has a weapon,
who in some sense considers the injury of loud rap music to be so great that he
engages in this altercation, and at some point is so convinced that the young men
in this vehicle pose a threat to him, that he hallucinates a weapon, or you might
say, he might just have come up with this as a story completely synthetically
18
later. Either version of this tells us he is willing to impart some kind of injurious
impact to these young men that he does not know, and that’s going to be grounds
for him to use deadly force against them.
Unfortunately, these are not the only cases we could talk about. There’s
Theodore Wafer, who shot an unarmed black female teenager named Renisha

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Michael Muskal, Another Self-Defense Murder Case, Involving Race, Shakes Florida, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 7, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/07/nation/la-na-nn-florida-self-defense-murder-case20140207.
13. Id.
14. Botelho, supra note 9.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See id.
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19

McBride after she came looking for help following a car accident. Or Randall
Kerrick, who shot Jonathan Ferrell, who was an unarmed black man seeking
20
assistance after a car accident. Or Rodney Black, who shot two black men on
21
his property, or near his property, because he thought they were trespassing. As
it turns out, one of these men had bought the property next to him, and was in
fact just coming to take a look at it. What do some of these cases tell us? Is Stand
Your Ground and gun rights rhetoric really about real injury, or is it in fact
exacerbating an already existing hierarchy, between whose injury counts and
whose is perceived to count?
There’s a whole other story to talk about with regard to domestic violence.
Something that I’m happy to talk more about, because many of the promoters of
Stand Your Ground and gun rights rhetoric have tried to use women and
domestic violence victims as kind of a promotion for saying, “This is why you
should support these laws.”
As it turns out, there is a case ongoing in Florida, which gives a somewhat
other reading to the notion that Stand Your Ground protects domestic violence
victims. This is the case of Marissa Alexander, who was in her own home with
her husband from whom she was estranged, but also recently given birth to their
22
child. She had a Protection Order against him, because he had been abusive in
the past. They have a conversation, in which she shows him the pictures of their
child. She goes to the bathroom. He starts looking through her phone, and finds
some text messages that make him angry, make him think that she is cheating on
him.
When she tries to come back from the bathroom, he doesn’t let her go. He’s
pushing on her. He’s not letting her leave. She manages to break away. She flees
to her truck in the garage, realizing that the garage door opener will not work
(and this is something that is verified by her husband as well), realizing she has
to go back through the house. Instead of just going back in the house unarmed,
she takes the gun that she lawfully has from the truck back into the house. He
doesn’t want to let her leave. She’s telling him, “You have to go.” He says, “I am
23
not going anywhere.” She fires a warning shot to try to get him to leave.

19. Alana Semuels, Detroit-Area Man Gets 17 to 32 Years for Shooting Visitor on Porch, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 3, 2014, 4:38 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-porch-killer-sentenced-20140903story.html.
20. Mary C. Curtis, In a Police Shooting Case in Charlotte, Fewer Headlines but a Familiar Call for
Justice, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-people/wp/2014/12/12/ina-police-shooting-case-in-charlotte-fewer-headlines-but-familiar-call-for-justice/.
21. Chris Dickerson, Wrongful Death Suit Filed against Cabell Man Who Shot, Killed New Neighbor,
WEST. VA. REC. (Jun. 11 2014, 1:42 PM), http://wvrecord.com/news/267724-wrongful-death-suit-filed-againstcabell-man-who-shot-killed-new-neighbor.
22. Another Florida Case Puts Crosshairs on “Stand Your Ground,” NPR (Feb. 1, 2015), http://www.
npr.org/2015/02/01/383121919/another-florida-case-puts-crosshairs-on-stand-your-ground.
23. Id.
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You might have thought looking at the rhetoric of Stand Your Ground that
this is exactly what we’re supposed to protect. She’s defending herself. She’s in
her own home. It’s against someone that you can know in fact presents a threat of
injury, because he has in the past threatened to kill her if she was cheating on
him. The police here decided they are going to arrest her, they are going to
charge her, and she doesn’t get immunity for stand your ground in a hearing. She
is getting a retrial because, originally, she was sentenced to 20 years and she is
serving the beginning part of that 20‑year sentence. She is getting a retrial
because the appellate judge found that there have been some errors in terms of
24
the burden of self‑defense, but will not revisit the stand your ground issue.
As to the question of whether or not stand your ground in fact recognizes the
injury that actually does occur to domestic violence victims and which they can
take notice of when they are using deadly force, it doesn’t look as though this is
going to be a good example of that, which we can talk about more, maybe, later.
Just to touch on the other areas: the free speech context. What is interesting
about many of the controversies over free speech is that when there is a group
that is pushing to say this should be not protected speech, that this should be
considered harmful, injurious speech that should be regulated, the answer often is
there is only a narrow category of speech that can be regulated. If it doesn’t fall
into one of these historical categories of obscenity, or defamation or child
pornography, then it simply - we have to assume - by default that it is protected
speech.
When you have racial minorities raising hate speech claims as part of a way
of trying to draw attention to the type of injuries this speech causes, or you have
primarily female victims of online harassment or non‑consensual pornography
trying to say this is harmful and injurious, the response is there may be some
25
harm here, but it’s not very serious. To the extent that it’s anything at all, it’s
not nearly as serious as the injury to free speech that would occur should we do
anything to regulate this. What that overlooks in many cases is that it overlooks
that it’s not even true that there are only these tiny categories of speech that are
regulated. It ignores that fact that sometimes people don’t even bring up the free‑
speech context when they’re speaking of the types of conduct that can be
regulated.
If we look at copyright law, fraud law, identity theft, trade secrets,
nondisclosure agreements, confidentiality agreements, generally, these are all
cases generally where people don’t usually say, “Oh, we can’t have physician‑
patient confidentiality or lawyer‑client privilege because that would regulate our
free speech.” It’s not even seen as being a free speech issue in many ways

24. Id.
25. See Mary Anne Franks, Adventures in Victim Blaming: Revenge Porn Addition, CONCURRING
OPINIONS (Feb. 1, 2013), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/02/adventures-in-victim-blamingrevenge-porn-edition.html.
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because the injuries are so easily conceptualized by the people who might think
about these types of conduct. We see that there’s a certain shifting of even the
frame of what is considered to be free speech in these types of potentially
injurious forms of conduct.
I know I’ve only got a few minutes left so I’m just going to briefly touch on
the sexual assault context. What I want to sketch out here is just the ways in
which the actual injury to actual rape victims tends to be downplayed in light of
the supposed risk either of false rape claims or the perceived injury of having a
conviction on someone’s record to their future professional and other interests.
Even though there is a very, very tiny chance that a person will ever be accused
falsely of rape, the notion of that injury is so real and so possible, it really does
take up a lot of space with regard to how we handle sexual assault claims to
begin with, how much scrutiny we need to take against them, and it manages to
shift our ways of looking at the kinds of injuries that rape victims come forward
to talk about. Even when we find ourselves in positions of convictions, even
when someone is told or the court does find that there was an actual rape that was
committed, very often the social resources and, in some cases, the legal
resources, are geared towards the supposed injury to the rapist themselves.
One recent example of this, for those of you who were paying attention to the
Steubenville rape verdict, you had a case where it was absolutely clear. There
was photographic evidence that these two young men had assaulted this girl who
was essentially passed out at a party. There was no doubt that really had
26
happened.
Yet, CNN, other outlets that were covering the trial when the guilty verdict
was read - and I should clarify here that the guilty verdict was one to two years in
a juvenile detention facility - because these young men were under the age of 18,
the immediate story that emerged from that was think about what this does to
these young men’s future prospects because they were very talented football
players. “They’re watching all of their lives go down the drain,” was basically
27
what the mainstream media reported on this as. Not a single mention of the
injury to the rape victim. This was really focused on the injury to the rapist
themselves in a context where it was not even ambiguous that they had
committed the crime.
There’s more to be said about that, too, in what I would call the popular
28
29
rehabilitation of convicted rapists like Mike Tyson, R. Kelly. R. Kelly is not a

26. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Ohio Teenagers Guilty in Rape that Social Media Brought to Light, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2013, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/us/teenagers-found-guilty-inrape-in-steubenville-ohio.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
27. See, e.g., CNN, CNN Grieves That Guilty Verdict Ruined ‘Promising’ Lives of Steubenville Rapists,
YOUTUBE (Mar. 17, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MvUdyNko8LQ.
28. E. R. Shipp, Tyson Gets 6-Year Prison Term for Rape Conviction in Indiana, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 27,
1992, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/27/sports/tyson-gets-6-year-prison-term-for-rapeconviction-in-indiana.html.
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convicted rapist, but it’s quite clear that he has committed many instances of
sexual assault, and the different ways that people treat accused rapists and their
30
accusers in ambiguous cases such as the Kobe Bryant case. Many people seem
to be absolutely convinced Kobe Bryant was not only innocent, but wrongly
targeted. His victim, she was on the receiving end of death threats for a very long
time, which was a large part of actually why she withdrew her complaint.
These are just a few examples that I want to sketch out about the damage not
only, again, in terms of the social and legal resources we have, where we’re
allocating those resources to understand injury, when it’s important, what we
should do about it, but also the damage that’s being done to the concept of injury
itself when these are the types of conversations and these are the types of
discourses that are promoted.
Sagit Mor, Lecturer, Assistant Professor, University of Haifa Law Faculty,
Israel. The Meaning of Injury: A Disability Perspective.
MOR:
I start with this nice quotation from a book titled Accidental Justice:
“The roots of tort law lie in human suffering, maimed bodies, shattered
31
spirits and extinguished lives.”
In my presentation, I would like to complicate the prevailing understanding
of injury with the infusion of the disability perspective. When we talk about torts
and equality or injury and culture, we are used to thinking about race and gender.
But we don’t think enough, I think, about disability as a component of identity
and culture in our understanding of injury. In this talk I suggest to think about the
experience of injury as an experience of enablement and argue that the meaning
of injury is shaped by one’s understanding of disability. If disability is
understood as pain, suffering, tragedy, and misfortune, injury, too, is understood
this way. But in an era of disability rights and disability critique that challenges
this negative view of disability—that taken for granted understanding of injury as
misfortune should also be challenged. A critical view of disability and injury,
therefore, brings new perspectives to the study of the law of torts, which is the
law of personal injury.
I suggest that the literature of disability studies and disability legal studies,
and I will say more about it during my talk, offers a new set of tools to
investigate the relationships between disability and injury, to interrogate the
socio-legal construction of injury and to examine the resulting implications for

29. See David Streitfeld, R. Kelly is Acquitted in Child Pornography Case, N. Y. TIMES ( Jun. 14, 2008),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/14/arts/music/14kell.html.
30. See generally Chuck Klosterman, Kobe Bryant Will Always Be an All-Star of Talking, GQ (Mar.
2015), http://www.gq.com/sports/201503/kobe-bryant-nba-allstar.
31. PETER A. BELL AND JEFFREY O’CONNELL, ACCIDENTAL JUSTICE: THE DILEMMAS OF TORT LAW xixii (1997).
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tort law. A disability legal studies analysis seeks to examine the ways in which
the law participates in the social construction of disability. Its focus of inquiry is
not so much on the rights and entitlements of disabled people but more broadly
on how assumptions about disability permeate any field of law, shaping the
32
design of legal norms and institutions and shaped by them.
This mode of inquiry is particularly relevant to the realm of tort law. In fact,
when it comes to the role of torts, the disability perspective is all encompassing
as it sheds a new light on the entire field of personal injury law. It is not only
about the identity of the wrongdoer or the injured person, even though there are
important questions concerning the duty and standard of care towards disabled
people or the expected level of care by disabled people. It is also not particularly
about a specific area or issue of torts law as opposed to what the vast literature on
wrongful life claims may suggest (the site in which disability critiques are
33
considered most seriously). It is rather about the structure and logic of torts law:
It is about the meaning of the transformation from being non‑disabled to
becoming disabled.
One such fundamental challenge to torts law would be the following, “Is it
possible to construct a concept of injury that is free of negative stigma and social
bias against disabled people, but still acknowledges the pain and the moral wrong
that an injury entails?”
I do not have a clear answer to that question, but I would like to offer some
thoughts.
A. The Disability Critique
First I would like to introduce the disability critique. The disability
movement and the disability study literature have transformed the meaning of
disability from an inherently inferior condition to a more complex social,
political and cultural phenomenon. A basic tenet of early disability studies theory
was a distinction between impairment, which is a “neutral” bodily variation, and
disability, which is the meaning that is assigned to that variation, as shaped by
power relations, cultural assumptions and social practices. Disablement is,
therefore, not only physical or cognitive or emotional, but also social; it is about
34
social attitudes and environmental barriers and adequate social services. The
disability impairment distinction can also enrich and complicate our
understanding of injury as a concept and experience that encompasses these two
dimensions altogether: Like impairment, injury has a seemingly value‑free
descriptive notion of an event that has caused a bodily change. Like disability,
32. See generally Bill Hughes & Kevin Paterson, The Social Model of Disability and the Disappearing
Body: Towards a Sociology of Impairment, 12 DISABILITY AND SOC’Y 325 (1997).
33. See, e.g., Adrienne Asch, Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory or Compatible? 30
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315 (2003).
34. See Hughes, supra note 32, at 325.
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injury has a more value‑laden aspect of an event that may transform one’s self‑
perception, social position, political power and even human worth and value.
Following a substantial injurious or disabling event, one may be transformed
from being “capable”, “whole” and “normal” to becoming “incapable”,
“damaged” and “abnormal”. This is not just because of physical and emotional
limitations, but also, and maybe mainly because of society’s response to
35
disability. The experience of injury is, therefore, influenced by the
physical/bodily change that one faces as well as the disabling social conditions
that he or she may experience.
Tort view of injury and disability is a tragic individualistic view that ignores
the role of social structures in generating disablement. This message is
transmitted by legal doctrines and by torts litigation which becomes a spectacle
of misery in which claimants are forced to participate in order to receive a higher
amount of damages. Viewed this way, torts law functions as a site of aggression,
a site in which the negative views about disability are produced and reinforced. It
is most evident in the realm of pain and suffering compensations. It is taken to
the extreme in wrongful life and wrongful birth cases in which disabled people
(allegedly) claim that they were better off if they were not born, and parents
argue that having a disabled child is a harm to the family.
Yet, at the same time, torts law serves several other functions: It provides
remedy for the economic consequences of disability, it serves to deter and
prevent future injuries, and it expresses a social and sometimes moral disapproval
of the injurious action. The challenge is therefore, to reconstruct a personal injury
law that is capable of accommodating these complexities and that is compatible
with a disability studies perspective.
The first and most immediate implication for tort’s law would be awareness
to disabling images and environmental barriers. This means viewing disability
not in a medicalized, individualized fashion, but rather through a social, cultural,
or political lens while acknowledging and even emphasizing the many
dimensions of the social construction of disability. The impact of stigmas and
stereotypes, the bearing of social structures and institutions, and the ways in
which the misallocation of society resources has led to poverty and lack of
36
opportunities for disabled people.
This view of disability may go even further not only to negate the negative
aspects of disability as socially reconstructed, but also to advance an affirmative
view of disability that embraces disability pride and celebrates disability culture.
This critical and important view of disability poses several difficulties relating to
basic notions in torts, such as harm, fault and causation: the understanding of

35. See Sagit Mor, Between Charity, Welfare, and Warfare: A Disability Legal Studies Analysis of
Privilege and Neglect in Israeli Disability Policy, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 63, 70 (2006).
36. Sagit Mor, Disability and the Persistence of Poverty: Reconstructing Disability Allowances, 6 NW. J.
L. & SOC. POL’Y. 178, 179 (2011).
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disability as a source of pride may impact its framing as harm; incorporating an
understanding of disability as a product of social barriers may affect the notion of
causation, and the destabilizations of harm and causation may affect the
attribution of fault to an individual wrongdoer.
Back to tort litigation as a spectacle of misery: can “happy litigants” litigate
to receive sufficient compensation to cover their losses and expenses? These
questions are not easy to answer.
B. Distinguishing Prevention From Elimination
One helpful direction may be to develop further the distinction that exists, at
least to some extent, in the disability bioethics literature between prevention and
elimination. While elimination of disabled people is an absolute wrong,
prevention of disability is a goal shared for disability scholars and disabled
people who disapprove the violation of autonomy and the infringement of bodily
integrity that an injury entails, and at the same time are aware to the social
consequences of an injury.
This distinction was raised, particularly with regards to prenatal diagnosis
37
and care. If disability-based termination of pregnancy is morally wrong based
on disability advocates or at least questionable, should we care about pregnant
women taking folic acid, eating right, and avoiding alcohol? That is the
prevention and elimination dilemma. The challenge for tort law here lies in
condemning dangerous acts back, but avoiding the devaluation of injured
persons.
C. Complicating the Distinction Between Disability And Impairment
Another complimentary direction would be a more complex understanding of
the relationships between disability and impairment. The division between
impairment and disability was criticized by subsequent disability studies scholars
for its neglect of the body—The physical experience of pain, and more broadly
the lived experience of the body. The challenge, as some scholars put it, was “to
rescue the concept of ‘suffering’ from its reactionary and tragic association. . . .
[And] to think of suffering as a concept which reflects the mutual engagement of
38
pain and oppression”. Acknowledging pain allows more space for discussing
the painful aspects of injury. Scholarship on the sociology of impairment and the
social construction of pain may help us with these predicaments by offering an
alternative that may be useful for the reconstruction of injury.

37. See, e.g., Adrienne Asch, Prenatal Diagnosis and Selective Abortion: A Challenge to Practice and
Policy, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1649 (1999).
38. Hughes, supra note 32, at 336.
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D. Tort Law as a Remedy for the Economic Consequences of Disability
One common reaction to these concerns is the argument that tort law is a
source of financial relief for disabled people. The economic consequences of
disability are partially a result of the bodily injury and partly a result of the
inaccessible society and inadequate social welfare policy. Tort damages may be a
way to ameliorate these financial difficulties.
The problem for me here is that it benefits only the few. If we care about
disabled people’s economic opportunities we may need to take a different
direction and rethink the relationships between tort law and social security law. A
true and deep commitment to the economic and personal wellbeing of all
disabled people should they need us to examine more carefully the structure of
the welfare system, social insurance, and social security more broadly. Adequate
health services, adequate social services (including education and housing
services), and adequate disability allowances would allow this more injured
people to remain fully integrated in society and to feel valued and worthy
39
following an injury.
In fact, the more social and medical services are provided by the state the
level of per punitive damages are awarded in courts can be expected to decrease.
Furthermore, the more accessible, accommodating, inclusive, and egalitarian a
society becomes, injured people’s need for compensation for wage loss and pain
and suffering can be expected to decrease as well.
E. A New/Renewed Role for Torts Law
What we might need is a new goal, new purpose, or a new role for tort’s law.
In a 1997 piece titled Tort Law’s Role as a Tool for Social Justice Struggle,
Lesley Bender, one of the first feminist critics of the tort law, argued that tort law
was always about social justice and human dignity that was achieved through
compensations, but somehow, with time, “the means . . . came to be understood
40
as the end. . . . “
We need to go back to tort law’s initial role and purpose, which was,
41
according to Bender, protecting human dignity and promoting social cohesion. I
conclude with the challenge that I started with: the need to reconstruct a concept
of injuries that is free of negative stigmas and social bias but still acknowledges
the pain and the moral wrong that an injury entails.

39. See Mor, supra note 36, at 184-86
40. Leslie Bender, Tort Law’s Role as a Tool for Social Justice Struggle, 37 Washburn L.J. 249, 251
(1997).
41. Id.
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Samantha Barbas, Associate Professor of Law, SUNY Buffalo Law School
THE LAWS OF IMAGE
BARBAS:
In 1947, the “Saturday Evening Post” ran a critique of cab drivers in
42
Washington, DC that accused them of cheating their customers. A photograph
appeared with the article that depicted a woman cab driver. The caption did not
name her and the article did not refer to her. Although the woman consented to
be photographed, she didn’t know that the picture would be used in an article on
cheating cabbies and she sued the magazine.
In 2012, after receiving calls from her neighbors, a woman found that her
daughter’s picture had been used in an ad for an ice cream store without the
daughter’s or the mother’s consent. Her daughter had simply “liked” the ice
cream store on Facebook. She was affronted and embarrassed. People across the
country whose photographs had been similarly exploited under Facebook’s
43
Sponsored Stories program sued Facebook.
Angry at these false, misleading, unflattering depictions these individuals
could have pursued numerous paths to recourse. They chose to sue. Like an
increasing number of Americans in the past 100 years, these people turned to the
law to help them defend their reputations and public images. The 20th century
saw the creation and development of what I describe as an American law of
public image, and the phenomenon of personal image litigation.
Under the laws of public image, as they currently exist, a person can sue if he
or she has been depicted before the public in an embarrassing or upsetting
44
manner, even if no one thinks less of the person because of it. If a newspaper or
a website publishes your picture in a way you find offensive, you can under
certain circumstances, receive damages for the outrage you feel that someone has
interfered with your public image and the way you want to be known to the
world.
The laws of image consist of the tort actions for invasion of privacy,
defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. One’s image, or
public image, as I define it, is one’s public face, the persona one creates and
projects to others, an externalization of the self. Image overlaps with, but is
distinct from reputation, which is an external judgment, how others see you.
Image law protects both the right to a good reputation and the right to one’s
image, the right to control one’s public image and to feel good about one’s public
presentation of self. These laws of image are a modern invention. They were
created to address modern conceptions of the self and personal injury.

42. Peay v. Curtis, 78 F. Supp. 305, 306 (D.D.C. 1948).
43. Steve Henn, Facebook Users Question $ 20 Million Settlement Over Ads, NPR (May 13, 2013),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/05/14/182861926/facebook-users-question-20-millionsettlement-over-ads.
44. See Peay, 78 F. Supp. 305.
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A historian of the American law and society, my work, which will be
appearing in a forthcoming book, explores the origins of these laws of public
image, tracing them to the rise of what I describe as an image‑conscious self, the
modal self of the mass mediated, mass consumer society of the 20th century. The
laws of image, I argue, are an expression of the people who have invested heavily
in their images, who have come to see their public images as critical to their
identities, so that an injury to one’s image constitutes an injury to one’s self. I
present a brief overview of the history from 1900s to 1960, what I see as the
foundational years in this development.
The story begins with a rise of major urban centers in the United States in the
late 19th century. Urbanization transformed concepts of self and social identity.
In the cities, in contrast to small communities, one’s social identity was often a
function of first impressions and images rather than ongoing contact—what
observers might infer about someone based on fleeting glimpses and chance
encounters on the streets, and in other urban venues. Urban dwellers became
conscious of themselves as superficial images in eyes of others. They sought to
master and perfect their public images through careful manipulation of such
externalities as their clothing, speech, and gestures.
There was to be a reward for this “impression management,” to use
45
sociologist Erving Goffman’s term. At a time of great social mobility, when
social hierarchies were yet unstable, it was thought that individuals could create
new identities and advance in status by appearing more refined than they really
were. As people became increasingly possessive and protective of their images,
they became sensitive to threats of their public images, especially from the massmarket press. The popular press, which had begun to trade in gossip and other
intimate accounts of personal life, was becoming an industry of counterimage,
devoted to undermining people’s social facades.
In the late 1800s, in significant number, both famous and ordinary people
began to sue the press for defamation, the law’s traditional remedy for injuries to
reputation. Historically, the tort of defamation dealt with false statements that
lowered one’s standing among one’s peers. It did not always or adequately
address the problem of media gossip, with facts that were often true, and that did
not necessarily injure reputation, but nonetheless caused humiliation and distress.
The search for legal remedies for the gossip problem led to the invention of the
right to privacy.
Proposed in 1890, the right to privacy was a right to not have one’s picture or
personal information displayed to the public against one’s will, in an
46
embarrassing or upsetting manner. Long before it offered protection against
unauthorized data collection, government spying or intrusions into one’s private

45. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
46. Samantha Barbas, The Death of the Public Disclosure Tort: A Historical Perspective, 22 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 171, 177 (2010).
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space, the right to privacy was a right to control one’s public image, and to be
compensated for emotional distress when the media interfered with one’s desired
public persona. By the 1940’s, the right to privacy had been accepted in most
jurisdictions. It was the manifestation of the personal image consciousness that
had become central to conceptions of self and identity in image saturated, media
47
saturated, mass society.
The majority of privacy cases did not involve disclosure of material that was
especially intimate or private, but rather situations where an individual had been
presented to the public in a way that contradicted her own self‑image, even if not
objectively negative. In 1944, a woman named Zelma Cason, who was the
inspiration for a character in a famous book, sued the author. The portrayal was
actually complimentary, although in one part the author described her as “an
ageless spinster resembling an angry and efficient canary,” and noted that she
used profanity. The Florida Supreme Court held that although the depiction was
really quite benign, Cason had a cause of action for invasion of privacy, because
the author had interfered with her ability to create and project her own public
48
persona as she wished.
The law of privacy was part of a larger body of personal image law that had
come into being, as courts and legislatures sought to give people greater control
49
of their public images in an age of proliferating mass communications.
Plaintiffs who had been publicly depicted in a manner that was highly offensive
to them brought suit under the new tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. New statutes imposed liability for the personal affront caused by the
media use of people’s likenesses without consent. In an historic shift, defamation
law expanded to remedy not only harms to reputation, but injuries to people’s
feelings caused by displeasing media depictions, as when one woman sued a
newspaper over the publication of a photo of her as a baby—not because it was
defamatory, but simply because it was embarrassing.
With a rise of a celebrity culture and a consumer culture, the right to control
one’s image would by the 1950s yield a right of publicity, the right to reap the
50
fruits from the commercial exploitation of one’s image. Popular support for
these image torts tracked a growing cultural emphasis on social appearances and
self‑presentation in public.
In the early 20th century, as white collar jobs removed individuals from the
production process, and demanded involvement with people rather than things,
persuading and pleasing others, and selling one’s self and one’s image, was
51
described as “essential to career advancement.” Work such as Dale Carnegie’s

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
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1937 bestseller “How to Win Friends and Influence People” reinforced the idea
that the key to success was to manage one’s image in order to impress and
manipulate others.
In the 1920s, the ad industry developed the concept of psychological
advertising, which promoted products by creating anxieties around personal
image. Ads reminded consumers that they were constantly on display before the
critical, searching gaze of others, and that their appearances and public images
could be doctored, repaired, refurbished, and improved. The beauty and fashion
industries offered innumerable possibilities for transforming one’s image. The
first half of the 20th century saw the popularization of the visual media—
photography, film, and television, which accentuated the sense of being an image
in the eyes of others. The film actor, who gained renown for his image, and for
whom taking off and putting on guises was an art and a profession, became a role
52
model and a cultural icon.
By the 1930s, images were being described as congruent with the self. In an
increasingly mobile and diverse society, people were becoming unmoored from
traditional sources of personal identity, such as family, communities, and
institutional religion. There was a more malleable, free-floating view of the self.
Social psychologists began to describe the modern self as fragmented and
discontinuous. It was a set of shifting roles and multiple personalities, assembled
53
out of the various impressions one made on others.
In the words of Charles Horton Cooley, the self is comprised of, quote, the
imagination of our appearance to another person, the imagination of one’s
judgment of that appearance, and some sort of self‑feeling, such as pride or
54
mortification. The self was one’s image and even more one’s feelings about
one’s image and one’s feelings about other people’s feelings about one’s image.
By the postwar era, critics observed an other‑directed self, a personality type, the
modal self of an affluent consumer society, consumed with the act of
constructing a pleasing social facade.
In 1962, the historian Daniel Boorstin observed that when people talked
55
about themselves, they talked about their images. The more that a desirable
public image was regarded as the basis of status, advancement and personal
fulfillment, and more one’s social appearance’s seen as coextensive with one’s
identity, the deeper this sense of possessiveness towards one’s image and the
56
sense of entitlement, including a legal entitlement, to control it.
The number of lawsuits of defamation of privacy grew steadily in the mid‑
20th century. Personal image litigation became a fixture of the legal landscape.
52. Barbas, supra note 46, at 190-92.
53. See id. at 195.
54. Charles Horton Cooley, Looking-Glass Self (1983), reprinted in THE PRODUCTION OF REALITY:
ESSAYS AND READINGS ON SOCIAL INTERACTION 126, 126 (Jodi O’Brien ed., 2011).
55. BOORSTIN, supra note 50, at 249.
56. Id.
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By the 1960s, when privacy, autonomy, personal choice, and self‑expression had
become cultural and legal ideals, the ability to define, express and construct one’s
public persona without interference from others was being cast as a fundamental
personal right, critical to self‑determination and self‑actualization.
What we see over the course of the 20th century is the legalization of image,
in that one’s public image and appearance, once regarded principally as social
matters to be worked out through social interaction, came to be regarded also as
57
legal entities, proper subjects for legal supervision and intervention. This marks
an important development in the history of the law and the modern history of the
self.
My argument that there has been a significant law of image in the United
States is somewhat unconventional. As many have pointed out, American laws
do not protect the right to one’s image as extensively as in other parts of the
world. In some European countries, under certain circumstances, newspapers or
websites can be forbidden from publishing ostensibly newsworthy pictures of
people or facts on the public record without the subject’s authorization.
This broad protection of personal image would be unimaginable in the
United States. Since the 1940s, American image laws have been substantially
58
constrained by freedom of speech. But free speech did not kill the libel and
privacy tort. The privacy tort is not dead, as often described. The free speech
restrictions represent another dimension, perhaps the flip side of our image
consciousness. In a culture where images have been the currency of social
exchange, where politics and social lines have been mediated by images, the
ability to freely disseminate images of people and public affairs has been
described as one of the core values in the First Amendment.
Expressive freedom in the US has come to embody two competing ideals. It
means the freedom to express oneself through one’s public image. At the same
time, it’s the freedom to make and distribute images of other people, even if
caustic, embarrassing, or unflattering. We want to control our own public images,
yet we want to be able to tear down other people’s images freely and without
restriction. What I’m trying to do is to re‑frame the traditional story about the
evolution of these laws by tying the history of the legal development to the rise
of new concepts of self and personal harm, concepts that arose from the cultural
circumstances and pressures of the United States in the 20th century.
My work is not a history of celebrities and public figures only, but ordinary
people and their assertion of a right to protect their images, and their feelings
about their images, which is a novel modern phenomenon. Politicians, actors, and
other notables have long been concerned with their public images. Yet, contrary
to what is often assumed, the majority of privacy and libel suits in the 20th
century were brought by private citizens and many of quite humble background.
57. Peay, 78 F. Supp. at 307.
58. Barbas, supra note 46, at 206.
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In a culture that has held out the possibility of social advancement and self‑
fulfillment through self‑transformation, particularly through changes in external
conduct and appearance. For every person, image may really be worth
something. Thank you.
Anne Bloom, Associate Dean for Faculty Scholarship and Professor of
Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; Marc Galanter,
Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School “Good
Injuries.”
BLOOM:
. . . Our project focuses on better understanding how contemporary American
cultural practices see the difference between injury and enhancement. Consider
the following practices: body building, corseting, head/neck shaping, foot
binding, circumcision, dieting, piercing, tattooing, plastic surgery, serialization,
castration. In each instance, the result of the practice can sometimes be read as
injury, and other times be read as enhancement depending on the cultural setting.
We could also call the results of these practices welcomed, valued or perhaps
expressive injuries.
These arguably good injuries can be sorted along several dimensions. These
are some of the dimensions we have identified: . . . temporary/permanent,
reversible/irreversible,
public/invisible,
decorative/restorative,
and
signifying/masking. Some good injuries can also be understood in terms of a
59
particular ordeal, a formative experience, or a marker of a stage of life. More
generally, whether injuries are viewed as harmful or enhancing is frequently
influenced by fashion or religious obligation. Where either is at play, we tend to
review the result of the practices like circumcision, piercing and tattooing as
enhancement, rather than injury. This distinction between enhancement and
injury is an important one for purposes of law and regulation.
Legal regulation of practices that are viewed as enhancement tend to focus
more on hygiene and professional standards for the practices. Legal regulation of
practices that result in injuries, on the other hand, generally focus on prohibiting
the practice entirely, the age for consent, or perhaps awarding tort damages. . . .
We are considering the intersection and overlap between cultural understandings
of injury and enhancement, and the legal regulation of tattoo practices and plastic
surgery.
We suggest that the increasing frequency of such practices may be associated
with a categorical shift from injury to enhancement. At the same time, the
increasing frequency appears to correlate with greater regulation of the practices
in the form of professional standards and licensing. That said, it’s not entirely

59. Amy J. Derick & Anne E. Laumann, Tattoos And Body Piercings in The United States: A National
Data Set, 55 J. AM. ACAD. DERMATOLOGY 413, 413 (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.sciencedirect.
com/science/article/pii/S0190962206008310.
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clear whether an increase in tattooing lead to greater regulation, or the other way
around. The same is true with plastic surgery.
We also know some that important differences in the regulation of tattoo
practices and plastic surgery seem to correspond with differing cultural
perceptions of these practices. I’m going to start with tattoo practices. Data on
the prevalence of tattoos in the United States suggests a clear cultural trend in the
60
direction of increased frequency in tattooing practice. . . .
[T]attoo practices are often tied to marking or commemorating specific
events or self‑expression . . . They may also be employed to mark group identity
as in gangs. At the same time, some tattoo practices are intended to express
resistance to dominant norms, in which tattoos become emblems of self‑
determination. . . . When used in this way, tattoo practices are closely connected
with the construction of individual identity and the expression of cultural norms.
In either case, regulations on tattoos arguably interfere with the freedom to shape
one’s own identity and to participate in practices aimed at challenging dominant
cultural norms.
However, around the same time that we see an uptake in tattoo practices, or
perhaps a few years before, again it’s not entirely clear which came first, we see
increased regulation of tattoo practices . . . Generally, states regulate the
minimum hygiene standards for the tattoo procedure itself, the equipment, the
61
tattoo artist, and the building in which the tattoo practices are taking place.
More than half of the states in the United States also require tattoo artists to
register, be certified, or obtain a license before engaging in tattooing.
Although many states do not require tattoo artists to be registered, or
certified, or licensed, almost all of them require the tattoo establishment itself be
licensed. Most states also have regulations concerning and controlling the
62
tattooing of minors. Here we see how the age of the tattoo recipients seems to
mark a reverse categorical shift from enhancement back to injury if the recipient
is too young.
Even among adults, the failure to provide consent can transform the practice
from enhancing to injurious. The increased regulation of tattoo practices suggest
a growing acceptance of tattooing as a practice of enhancement, rather than
injury, but at the same time the restrictions of certain times of tattoo practices,
such as tattooing minors, continues to suggest that under some circumstances the
practice results in what the client may view as enhancement is stilled viewed as
injury under law.

60. Id.
61. Valeria P. Carlson, Everett J. Lehman & Myrna Armstrong, Tattooing Regulations in U.S. States,
2011, 75 J. ENVTL. HEALTH 30 (Oct. 2012), available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/111467
2036?accountid=25316.
62. Tattoos and Body Piercings for Minors, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS (Dec 2012),
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/tattooing-and-body-piercing.aspx.
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While law intersects with culture in this context, and perhaps shapes certain
types of tattoo practices, the relationship between the two still seems complex.
On the one hand, increased regulation seems to have legitimated and perhaps
professionalized tattooing practices, and in doing so made the practices more
accessible and culturally acceptable. At the same time, increased regulation may
have lessened some of tattooing’s transgressive and perhaps expressive
appeal. . . .
Tattoo artists and recipients have their own norms about what is acceptable,
including norms against copying designs, norms about placement of tattoos and
norms regarding the use of obscenity, objectionable symbols and slogans. Some
tattoo artists flaunt the norms. Generally, however, most tattoo artists work
63
within the norms . . .
In short, while tattooing is commonly seen as a culturally transgressive act, it
is not normless. In fact, tattoo practices seem to represent a way of negotiating
autonomy, even so the parameters for what practices are permissible even outside
the bounds of formal law appear to be subject to ongoing contestation in
negotiation within the community of practice itself. . . .
Like tattooing, plastic surgery practices suggest that the line between injury
and enhancements is culturally contested. Historically, plastic surgery practices
began as a technique for normalizing bodies with culturally unacceptable
differences. In this sense, the surgery was seen as necessary to repair some sort of
injury and not to cause an injury itself.
Some of the earliest plastic surgeries were developed to rebuild the noses of
16th century syphilitics so the symptoms of the disease would be less visible.
Similarly, the first plastic surgeons to perform so-called anti‑aging surgeries,
insisted upon the “bitter need” for the surgeries to erase the evidence of aging
64
that marks older women as culturally different and unemployable.
The real surge in plastic surgery, however, occurred after World War One,
65
when surgeons employed the techniques of injured soldiers. Around this time
plastic surgeons began to distinguish between plastic surgeries to repair injured
66
body parts and cosmetic surgeries that focused on an enhancement. This
distinction is quite important for plastic surgery consumers. Cosmetic surgical
practices became more cultural currencies to become more culturally accepted
and typically qualify for insurance coverage when they are reclassified as
67
plastic.
The distinction between plastic and cosmetic surgeries, however, is not
always clear. The history of eye-lifts provides an example. The Japanese
63. See generally Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511 (2013).
64. KATHY DAVIS, DUBIOUS EQUALITIES AND EMBODIED DIFFERENCES: CULTURAL STUDIES ON
COSMETIC SURGERY 25-27 (2003).
65. Id. at 24-25.
66. Id.
67. Anne Bloom, Plastic Injuries, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 759, 771 (2014).
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physician Mikamo pioneered eye-lifts in 1896. At first, he focused on blending
western and Japanese aesthetic ideals to perfect what was initially seen as a
purely cosmetic procedure. Over time, however, he began to argue that the lids in
his Japanese patient were physical defects or inherent injuries that needed to be
68
corrected, repaired . . .
Today plastic surgeries are a multi‑billion dollar industry and the number of
69
procedures performed annually is on the rise. Cultural reactions for this uptake,
however, are mixed. On the one hand faking of physical attributes it’s become so
widespread that it’s almost seen as culturally mandated especially for women of a
certain age and social class. But while faking is ubiquitous, the acceptable
possibilities for faking are also quite constrained. In the case of aging women, for
70
example, it’s not culturally acceptable to fake older. . . .
Consider in contrast the plastic surgery practices of the French artist Orlan
71
who uses her body as a medium for her art. Orlan was undergoing multiple
plastic surgeries to make parts of her body look more like the body parts that are
72
portrayed in famous works of art. Instead of making her look younger, the
surgeries tried to give her the forehead of Leonardo Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa, and
73
the chin of Botticelli’s Venus. Instead of trying to look natural, Orlan used her
74
faking as a struggle against nature.
There’s one important way, however, in which Orlan’s artistic practice is not
so different than ordinary plastic surgery consumers. Orlan emphasized that she
75
used the surgeries as a way of becoming more fully herself. In interviews with
plastic surgery, consumers indicated the view their own surgeries in a similar
76
way. Most people undergoing plastic surgery say like Orlan that they view their
77
surgeries as vehicles of self‑expression and self‑determination.
What is clear, however, is that ordinary plastic surgery consumers are not
presented with the same array of options as Orlan. Although, Orlan was
ultimately successful in getting surgeons to perform the surgeries that she sought.
Most plastic surgeons would not agree to do surgeries like the ones that she
obtained, even though she is a well‑known artist. This is because the particular
aesthetic result that Orlan has been seeking to achieve, that is, body parts that
68. Id. at 772.
69. See generally ALEX KUCZYNSKI, BEAUTY JUNKIES: INSIDE OUR $15 BILLION OBSESSION WITH
COSMETIC SURGERY (2005); see also American Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgeons, QUICK FACTS:
Highlights of the ASAPS 2011 Statistics on Cosmetic Surgery, available at http://www.surgery.org/
sites/default/files/2011-quickfacts.pdf.
70. Bloom, supra note 67, at 765.
71. For a discussion of Orlan’s art, see DAVIS, supra note 64, at 106-15.
72. Id. at 107.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 109.
75. Id. at 110.
76. Id.
77. DAVIS, supra note 64, at 110.
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resemble those portrayed in famous works of art do not correspond with the
range of aesthetic procedures that are considered acceptable to most plastic
78
surgeons.
At an earlier point in history, for example, many plastic surgeons in the
United States refused to perform surgeries that might allow an individual to fake
79
race. Today, plastic surgeons readily assist consumers with faking race, but they
may refuse to perform other types of surgeries that they currently consider
aesthetically undesirable such as the so called feline look in which plastic surgery
80
consumers seek to look more like cats.
These aesthetic determinations of plastic surgeons on the other hand, are
returned and supported by regulations that govern plastic surgery. We should put
high professional standards set by plastic surgeons themselves and by legal
standards and tort law that determine injury in the plastic surgery context by
deferring to the judgments of plastic surgery. You’re not injured unless the
plastic surgeon says that you are. These judgments in turn restrict the self‑
expressive choices that plastic surgery consumers can make . . . .
GALANTER: I just want to add when we talk about cultural practices that
there’s really a long dimension say with society wide practices at one end,
practices that are prevalent within majority groups and various self‑defined
minorities and finally people in the closet. It’s not sufficient to say that these are
cultural practices, but basically we have an enormous variety in which the same
practice can be the most unthinking conformity at one end of the scale and
violently individualistic definition at the other end of the scale. We need to refine
our notion of corporeal practices to take into account this type of variation.
DAVID M. ENGEL, “STAIRS, CHAIRS, AND AUTOMOBILES:
WHAT INJURY? WHAT LUMPING?”
ENGEL:
My paper attempts to catalog the reasons why lumping is so prevalent, at
least in American legal culture. After four decades of socio‑legal research, it
seems clear that the puzzle at the heart of American tort law is not why so many
people litigate but why so few litigate. It’s pretty clear from all the research that’s
been done that the vast majority of injured Americans don’t sue, they don’t
consult a lawyer, and they don’t make any claim against another party.
This practice—or non‑practice—has been termed lumping, which means that
the injured party absorbs the cost and the consequences of the injury without any
significant attempt to hold the injurer responsible, legally or non‑legally.
Researchers have found that roughly nine out of ten injury victims engage in

78. Id. at 109.
79. Bloom, supra note 67, at 769.
80. Id. at 768 n.68, 778.
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lumping, not claiming, and only two to three percent wind up suing even when
81
their injuries are caused by negligence.
It is the dog that doesn’t bark in the night that deserves our attention, but
there’s something mysterious about this massive tendency to lump our injuries.
Why do so few injury victims assert a claim, and where do all the other cases go?
It seems that the base of the tort law pyramid is really where the action is. Or
rather, it’s where the most important inaction is.
This question deserves more attention than it’s received so far. The papers in
this conference have made a great contribution by showing that injuries are
cultural constructs. Injuries are not facts, they aren’t givens, and even counting
them raises difficult conceptual problems. By understanding how people
construct injuries, and how they connect them to a sense of self, maybe we can
begin to figure out the mystery of why so much lumping occurs. As I was
thinking about this, I came up with at least six ways in which the social
construction of injury might operate to increase the likelihood of lumping rather
than claiming. They are:
1. Variability in the perception that pain even exists.
2. Even painful experiences may be interpreted as beneficial, not
harmful.
3. Many harmful experiences are viewed as natural within particular
social or physical environments.
4. The choice to expose others to the risk of harm may be hidden from
view, making the resulting injuries appear inevitable.
5. Self-blame is a common response to injuries and reduces the
likelihood of lodging a claim against anyone else.
6. Cultural norms tend to favor the ethic of personal responsibility over
the ethic of social responsibility to prevent injuries or pay
compensation when they occur.
Today I will have time to focus only on numbers two, three, and four. I will
begin with the idea of “beneficial pain.” A classic example is foot binding in
China, a practice that was excruciatingly painful and made it difficult to walk for
the rest of one’s life. Yet, for a time, foot binding was not viewed as the infliction
of an injury but as an enhancement of one’s beauty and a symbolic token of
nobility.
81. See generally David M. Engel, Lumping as Default in Tort Cases: The Cultural Interpretation of
Injury, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 33 (2010), available at http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1017&context=llr.
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A modern example is male circumcision. The American medical
establishment endorsed male circumcision for more than a century because it was
thought to prevent disease and deformity. And of course the Jewish and Islamic
traditions have long viewed circumcision as conferring an important religious
benefit. Today, however, some critics argue that male circumcision is a form of
child abuse and even a human rights violation. They point out that the procedure
is so painful for adults that it would require general anesthesia, but it’s typically
82
performed on infants without that precaution.
Nevertheless, some defenders of circumcision argue that pain itself can be
beneficial. In the words of one mohel, who performs the circumcision on infants,
“There is a misconception that pain is a bad thing to be avoided at all cost. Pain is
part of life as a human being. We could not survive without pain. We could not
learn and grow as individuals without pain. You cannot give your child a life
83
without pain. The consequence of doing that would be disastrous.”
As recently as the year 2005, more than 1.2 million circumcisions were
performed on more than 56 percent of the newborn male babies in the United
States. These numbers go up and down because the medical establishment keeps
changing its position on the practice. For the most part, circumcised male babies
are not seen as injury victims but as the recipients of a religious or medical
benefit. The absence of claims or, in other words, the presence of lumping,
strikes most people as normal and expected. This view may change if the position
84
of the critics eventually prevails.
Natural injuries. Even when individuals feel they have been injured, their
suffering may seem natural and not the basis for a claim. Chairs are a case in
point. Consider the case of a middle-aged office worker who suffers from back
pain, spinal deformity, varicose veins and circulatory and digestive problems.
That individual can’t recall any traumatic incident that caused the symptoms, just
the development of pain and disability over a period of years. It may be
surprising to learn that those very ailments, especially back pain and spinal
deformities, can be caused by a familiar feature of our physical environment, the
chair.
Galen Cranz, a researcher at Berkley, says there’s nothing natural about
85
chairs.
There are societies that have no chairs, and people in those settings
82. David M. Engel, Perception and Decision at the Threshold of Tort Law: Explaining the Infrequency
of Claims, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 293, 320-21 (2013).
83. Stuart M. Berlin, From the Jewish Journal: Don’t Fear “Brit Milah,” BERIT MILAH NEWSL.
(National Org. of Am. Mohalim/ot), Oct. 6, 1989, quoted in Dena S. Davis, Male and Female Genital
Alteration: A Collision Course with the Law? 11 HEALTH MATRIX 487, 527 (2001), available at
http://www.cirp.org/library/legal/davis1/.
84. See Michael Alison Chandler, Circumcision, Long in Decline in the U.S. May Get a Boost from a
Doctors’ Group, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience/circumcision-long-in-decline-in-the-us-may-get-a-boost-from-a-doctors-group/2012/08/10/7816526ade3e-11e1-8e43-4a3c4375504a_story.html.
85. See GALEN CRANZ, THE CHAIR 23 (1998).
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86

have much healthier spines and fewer diseases. Moreover, she points out, there
87
are better and worse designs for chairs. We could reduce pain and suffering in
our society significantly by producing chairs with lower seats that have less
padding and a space between the seat and the back of the chair.
88
Office workers that are harmed by chairs rarely show up in injury surveys.
Their condition is viewed as a natural part of the aging process and not the result
89
of an accident or a reason to seek a remedy from anyone else. Lumping occurs
as a matter of course without any conscious decision by the victim.
Falling down the stairs is a little different from being harmed by your chair,
but a similar lumping process is at work. There’s no doubt in the minds of the
one million Americans who suffer painful stair falls every year that they have
been injured. But stairs are everywhere. They are a ubiquitous part of our
physical environment. The risks associated with them are usually seen as
unavoidable. When people fall down the stairs, the blame is usually assigned to
90
their inattentiveness, their age, or their physical disability.
In fact, however, a few ergonomics engineers have lately begun to
demonstrate that these injuries are by no means natural or, in many cases, the
fault of the victims. These one million stair falls every year can be significantly
reduced by better stair design, including broader treads, shorter risers, and the
91
elimination of variability in stair dimensions within a given staircase.
As my grandmother used to say, “Who knew?” If no one knows that a design
can be made safer, then most injury victims will continue to lump without giving
it another thought.
The last topic I have time to discuss today is injuries resulting from invisible
choices. Even when harms are created by conscious choice, that is, the deliberate
weighing of risks and benefits by injurers, these deeply embedded choices may
not be apparent to the victims or to society in general. As a result, even injuries
caused by conscious design choices may be naturalized and resolved by lumping.
Sarah Lochlann Jain has described these invisible choices brilliantly in her
book on Injury: The Politics of Product Design and Safety Law in the United
92
States (2006). In her words, particular levels of risk and decisions about the
distribution of responsibility for injuries are encoded in product design: “Design
decisions ineluctably code danger and injury at the outset of the production

86. Id. at 18.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Engel, supra note 82, at 315-16.
91. Id. at 316.
92. See generally SARAH LOCHLANN JAIN, INJURY: THE POLITICS OF PRODUCT DESIGN AND SAFETY LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES (2006).
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process . . . [and raise] the question of how human wounding counts, who ‘owns’
93
health, and how it is to count as a social good.”
Automobiles provide many examples to illustrate Jain’s point, such as air
bags, which the automobile manufacturers resisted long after it was known that
94
they could prevent many injuries and fatalities.
Eventually, a consensus
developed that the public should no longer be exposed to the risks associated
95
with collisions in cars without air bags. Often the manufacturers’ decisions
about safety lag behind what is technologically possible. They reveal a more
fundamental set of assumptions about how much injury it is desirable or efficient
to impose on society, and who should bear the pain.
A similar shift is now underway in the social consensus about providing rear
view cameras on automobiles. Federal regulators estimate that 267 deaths, and
96
approximately 15,000 injuries, are caused each year by vehicles backing up.
97
According to one study, the victims average only two years of age.
Everyone would agree that these harms to children should be counted as
injuries, but are they actionable injuries? Not if it’s assumed that cars are a
ubiquitous part of our physical environment, and that they naturally come with a
98
blind spot making risks to small children unavoidable. According to this line of
thinking, such injuries are an inevitable risk of having automobiles. Good parents
don’t let their kids play in driveways. Good kids listen to their parents. Maybe
not my kids or your kids, but good kids do.
Once again, it doesn’t appear that any major technological breakthrough was
needed to install rear view cameras in cars. Their absence simply reflected a set
of assumptions about who should be responsible for the risk of harming children
in this way, and whose costs and benefits should be given the most weight. These
choices were invisible to most of us until the issue began to receive publicity, and
99
eventually the attention of Congress.
A consensus recently emerged that a vehicle without a rear view camera is
100
defective, that this type of injury should not be encoded in the vehicle design.
93. Id. at 56.
94. The Truth About Airbags, SMARTMOTORIST.COM, http://www.smartmotorist.com/traffic-and-safetyguideline/the-truth-about-airbags.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2014).
95. Id.
96. U.S. DEP’T. OF TRANSP., DOT-HS-811-144, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION: FATALITIES AND INJURIES IN MOTOR VEHICLE BACKING CRASHES
(2008).
97. Backovers–Child Tragedies, KIDSANDCARS.ORG, http://www.kidsandcars.org/back-overs.html (last
visited Oct. 27, 2014).
98. Keven Moore, Avoid Tragedy of Driveway Accidents; Proceed with Caution, KYFORWARD.COM (July
24, 2012), http://www.kidsandcars.org/upload/pdfs/articles/2012/2012-keven-moore-blog.pdf.
99. See U.S. DEP’T. OF TRANSP., RIN 2127-AK43, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION: FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS; REAR VISIBILITY
(2014).
100. Preventing Driveway Tragedies: Rear Cameras Help Drivers See Behind Them, Insurance Institute
for Highway Safety Status Report Vol. 49, No. 2 (March 31, 2014), http://www.iihs.org/iihs/news/
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Recent federal regulations mandate rear view cameras for all new cars and light
101
trucks starting in May 2018.
When shifts like this take place over time, injuries that were previously seen
as unavoidable or even natural come to be perceived as actionable. Until then,
102
these injuries and others like them are very likely to be lumped. Claiming
would seem absurd and inappropriate. It would seem an attempt to cash‑in on the
child’s misfortune and to shirk one’s personal responsibility. Lumping is the
normal and morally appropriate response.
I began by asking how we can explain why approximately nine out of ten
people respond to serious injuries by lumping without making any sort of claim
against the injurers. It now seems to me that the number is probably much higher
than ninety percent.
Lumping is even more widespread than we thought, and that’s because the
103
concept of injury itself is a moving target. It’s continually reshaped by
changing cultural norms and practices, potentially adding millions of illnesses
104
and painful events to what’s conventionally viewed as our injury rate.
I’ve tried to sketch an explanation of why our social construction of injury
tends mostly to produce lumping rather than claiming on such a massive scale.
For example, when painful experiences are framed as beneficial for medical or
religious reasons, they’re unlikely to result in claims. As the case of male
circumcision demonstrates, if we don’t see the injury, we lump without even
realizing we’ve made a choice.
Other kinds of painful experiences are indeed considered injuries, but they’re
lumped because the victim and others view them as natural occurrences. These
injuries are explained as the normal, and inevitable result of human interaction
with the physical environment, with the chairs, stairs, and automobiles that are
part of our daily lives. If responsibility for such injuries must be assigned, it is
usually attributed to the victims themselves.
Experts may surprise themselves and us with the news that the risk of harm
really isn’t inherent in a particular instrumentality, or activity, and could be
averted. That’s what happened, for example, with respect to stairs and rear view
cameras in cars. But in many instances it never occurs to anyone to rethink the
most common features of our physical surroundings.
In other instances, designers and manufacturers are well aware of the injuries
they cause, but they have calculated the risks and benefits and made invisible
decisions to embed those risks in the products or services in ways that encourage
others to view the injuries as unavoidable.
desktopnews/preventing-driveway-tragedies-rear-cameras-help-drivers-see-behind-them; see also, U.S. DEP’T.
note 99.
101. U.S. DEP’T. OF TRANSP., supra note 99.
102. See generally Engel, supra note 81, at 44.
103. See id.
104. See LOCHLANN JAIN, supra note 92, at ix.
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These are some of the ways in which injuries get steered away from the tort
law system, leading injury victims to absorb their misfortune without asking the
injurer for compensation or other remedy. Many injuries come to be seen as
natural, as nobody’s fault, even though the means to prevent them may actually
105
be close at hand.
If lumping is more widespread than is usually thought, then tort law may be
playing an even more marginal role than most of us ever suspected. If the dog
almost never barks in the night, then perhaps we need to rethink when and how
tort law matters, and how effectively it can actually provide compensation and
deterrence or deliver corrective justice.
The answers can be quite important for the millions of Americans who suffer
pain and misfortune each year, and who for the most part end up absorbing the
cost and consequences themselves.
GOWRI RAMACHANDRAN, DISCUSSANT:
. . . Some overlapping themes I saw through all of these papers is that
injury . . . is a moving target, and whether we even conceive of it as injury,
whether we conceive of it as a good injury, or a negligible, unimportant injury,
something we dismiss, all of that seems to be affected by a number of different
factors. There’s the difference between whether we conceive of something as
natural, or unnatural that seems to show up.
For instance, we see a lot of things in our environment, like chairs, and
poorly designed stairs, as natural. Because they’re part of the physical space, it’s
easy to ignore the choice that went into producing them. We also, I think, see a
lot of the status of various people and their physical state, whether that status is
disabled or able as natural, or when in fact it may be the product of a whole host
of social and legal choices.
There are also some distinctions that seem to arise from whether we perceive
someone’s physical state as normal or abnormal. This is different, I think, from
natural versus unnatural, whether we see it as conformist and typical or
abnormal.
I think we saw a lot of that in the examples that Professor Bloom and
Galanter gave us with tattooing and plastic surgery. Tattooing starts to seem less
and less like an injury as it becomes more and more normal, even though I don’t
think any of us perceive of it as natural, even though the practice is extremely
widespread now. Then there’s also whether a certain status is valued or
stigmatized. That can change whether we view entering or leaving that status as
an injury, or the repair of an injury. Then, finally, there seems to be a lot of
cultural shifting over whether something is deemed a de minimis injury, or a
significant injury. I think there’s this overriding theme that injury is culturally
constructed.

105. See id. at 19.
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. . . There also seems to be some cultural contest over whether, even
something that everyone agrees is an injury is de minimis is something we should
ignore versus whether it’s significant. Is this something in someone’s head, or
just their feelings that are unimportant, or are the feelings of the White male
property owner who feels threatened somehow incredibly significant, so
significant that it justifies killing someone in response?
Then finally there seems to be a lot of cultural contests over whether we
perceive something as tangible versus intangible status harm. The more tangible
it’s described as then the more we seem to see it as an injury. In Professor
Barbas’ piece I was thinking of this, because so much of what you talked about,
it’s an intangible thing. The feelings that someone has about the feelings that
other people have about their persona. That was a great way of putting it. The
law is describing it as an injury to image. It struck me that image is actually a
physical thing, that you can visually see. It’s not really an image in a lot of these
cases it sounds like that’s being harmed. It’s not as if someone’s photograph has
been altered and manipulated, and they’re made to appear in a way they do not,
and then that’s presented to the public. It’s more things like the person’s like of
ice cream, or that sort of thing is being exposed.
Even through our language, when we want to decide the thoughts of real
injury that law is going to take account of. We decide to describe it as if it’s a
tangible, physical injury, when it’s actually not. It’s actually an injury to
something very intangible.
This is all super interesting, because all these papers, although some of them
leaned more towards the descriptive than others, I think they all raise the big
question for us that Professor Franks probably made the most explicit, which is,
“What are the implications normatively of this, if we do make choices as a
society about what we construct as injury, and what we construct as either non‑
injury or non‑cognizable injury?”. . . .
III. INJURY NARRATIVES
Greg Johnson, Associate Professor of Religious Studies, University of
Colorado, Boulder.
Claire Rasmussen, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of
Delaware.
Lochlann Jain, Associate Professor of Anthropology, Stanford University.
Yoshitaka Wada, Professor of Law, Waseda University, Tokyo, Jpana.
Michael Musheno, Faculty Director of Legal Studies Program, School of
Law, UC Berkeley.
Greg Johnson, Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Religious
Studies, University of Colorado. Motion Through Friction: Perpetual
Kinship, Policing the State, and the Animation of Cultural Injury Claims in
Contemporary Hawaii
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JOHNSON:
. . . I’m a scholar of religion not law, but I’m going to be dealing with legal
issues. Please help when you see ways I could be gently nudged to be clearer in
the formulations I offer. As a scholar of religion, my attention has been drawn to
how moments of legal and political struggle, and even happenstance, overtime
get re-understood within traditions as moments of the formation of theological
doctrine. That kind of an insight is fairly common with any Western religious
tradition, and within the study of them.
A similar kind of insight is seldom applied by scholars of non-dominant
traditions, particularly with regard to indigenous traditions. If indigenous
traditions are experiencing moments of political and legal struggle, it is often
regarded by the media scholars and others, as an inauthentic moment, or a merely
political moment, or a moment where the tradition has gone in to decline of some
sort. I want to push back against that and say, “No, this mechanism of friction is
precisely the stuff of religious life.”
The honing of perspectives, the owning of responsibilities and so forth, let’s
pay that due attention. It’s a missed opportunity if we don’t. My attention is
drawn to Hawaiian legal contexts, and even the contexts where Hawaiians
dispute among themselves, but to attend in those moments to the generative
friction. What’s coming out of that religiously? Who emphasizes what? How
does the tradition take on new life at that moment, and so forth?
That’s the general framework I’m working within, but I want to take you into
a particular set of issues with regard to the state burial law. We have our tattoo
picture here. This is Kaleikoa Kaeo. He’s a famous native Hawaiian activist and
106
scholar. There’s an example of what I was talking about before with the skull
tattoos. In any case, the point of this slide is that in Hawaii, as with so many
places today, culture, tradition, politics and law are inseparable. They’re
articulating many things at once, and so a protest like this can also be fully a
107
religious moment in certain ways for certain people. I just want to flag that
analytical difficulty at the outset. Or analytical richness, as it can be thought of.
A quick sketch about burial law in Hawaii today. Of course, Hawaii was
colonized in the 1800s. Then in the 1900s tremendous development, particularly
108
by the military and by the tourist industry. Native Hawaiians tended to bury
their dead for the most part in beaches and beach sand. Of course, by way of

106. Resistance against Militarization of the Pacific, HAWAI’I PEACE & JUSTICE (Oct. 7, 2012),
http://www.wp.hawaiipeaceandjustice.org/2012/10/07/resistance-against-militarization-of-the-pacific/.
107. Steven Lohse, Speech at the Interfaith Alliance Hawai’i Aloha e PCD-UUA Awards (October 2014),
available at http://www.pcd-uua.org/currentsdocs/Honolulumoralbeacon.pdf.
108. American Experience: Hawaii’s Last Queen, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/hawaii/program.
html (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
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hotel development these are the most coveted sites. We have serious tension in
the making.
This tension came to a head in the late 1980s on the island of Maui at
110
Kapalua. The RitzCarlton hotel is where it is, a place called Honokahua. One
thousand one hundred sets of human remains were disinterred for the
111
development of this hotel. At about the same time, Native Hawaiians, like
many American Indians, were really coming to political consciousness in the
sense of saying, “Wait, we can work with the legal system, we can work through
the legal system to agitate for rights and to make sure this kind of thing doesn’t
112
happen.”
Native Hawaiians pushed back. They said, “The ancestors are speaking to us.
By coming out of the ground not of their own volition, by coming out of the
ground they’re coming awake and saying, ‘Children, wake up and do
113
something.’“ This is how many Hawaiians talk about it.
They pushed hard against the state and asked for a new state burial law, the
114
principal provision of which is that the state has five island burial councils.
Each council is made up by a majority of Native Hawaiian religious and cultural
115
experts. They have jurisdiction when human remains are found in certain
116
circumstances to say how those human remains should be treated. I’ll come
back to that in a minute.
One of the principal aspects of this is that the law now requires that an
archaeological inventory survey (AIS) be done for each development site. At
about the same time, a federal law was passed, the Native American Graves
117
Protection and Repatriation Act, NAGPRA, that you may be familiar with.
We have state law and federal law coming onto the scene at the same time,
and a florescence of Native Hawaiian religious life around the notion of the dead
and protecting the dead. This has always been part of Hawaiian life. They’re
genealogical in their thinking, deeply. The ancestors matter, but now they matter
in a newly concrete way that can be legally acted upon.
For 20 years, from the ‘90s until about 2007 and then the 2008 fiscal crisis,
this state burial law worked pretty well from a Native Hawaiian perspective. It
has started to fall apart from that same perspective because of lack of
109. Jeanne Cooper, Hawaii’s Burial Conflicts Give New Life to Cultural Activism, HAWAII INSIDER
(Aug. 13, 2009), http://blog.sfgate.com/hawaii/2009/08/13/hawaiis-burial-conflicts-give-new-life-to-culturalactivism/.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See generally Harold Nedd & K haunani Abad, KAMAKAKO’I, http://old.oha.org/kamakakoi/
olanaiwi.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
113. See generally id.
114. Cooper, supra note 109.
115. HAW. REV. STAT. § 6E-43.5 (2013).
116. Id.
117. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (1990).
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administrative oversight. That’s really what I want to discuss by way of an
example.
A church on graves; this is Kawaiaha•o Church, downtown Honolulu. It’s
traditionally regarded as the most Hawaiian church for two reasons. It’s one of
the original churches in Hawaii. It dates from the 1820s. Congregationalist
missionaries. It’s also the most Hawaiian in a Native Hawaiian sense. That is,
most of the congregation is Native Hawaiian. Some of the sermons are performed
in Hawaiian language. Many of the prayers are done in Hawaiian language, and
118
so forth.
What we’re really talking about is a dispute between Native Hawaiian
Christians and Native Hawaiians who may be Christian, but for the purpose of
this dispute wish to advocate against the church. The church itself is right in the
middle of the capital district, downtown. The church recently sought to develop a
multipurpose building, a large recreational facility on its grounds. To do so it
119
would need to remove a lot of bodies from its existing cemetery.
As this process started, more and more human remains were found. The
number is over 600 at this point. Native Hawaiian burial law activists say that the
church is at fault here for a variety of reasons, but most of all the state is at
120
fault. The state has injured them because it has not followed its own
administrative processes, and that’s what I want to get into.
We’re talking about one example of the state’s failure; the disinterment of
600 plus Iwi Kupuna, or ancestral human remains, from the grounds of and areas
adjacent to Kawaiaha`o Church. An injunction is currently in place, so the project
121
is stalled. We’re talking in real time, this is happening now.
The construction has stopped. It’s basically an open pit, the 600 Iwi Kupuna
122
are in the basement of the church as we speak. It’s before the Supreme Court of
the State of Hawaii. I’ll go more into that in a bit.
This is also about precedent and continuing issues in Hawaii about process
and law. It’s not just about this specific case. 600 injuries, at a minimum, are at
123
stake from the Native Hawaiian burial protection activist point of view. This is
injury to the ancestors.
As I mentioned, the bones have always mattered. They’re the source of
mana, power, of the physical continuance of genealogy. They also fructify the
land by burying, kanu, which means to plant. When you plant the bones you are
nurturing the land and something will grow; a power will grow from that. If

118. Kawaiaha’o Church Homepage, KAWAIAHA’O CHURCH, http://www.kawaiahao.org/ (last visited
Feb. 22, 2015).
119. Id.
120. Rick Daysog, Burial Counsel Blasts State Over Kakaako Project, HAWAII NEWS NOW (Jun. 12,
2014), http://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/story/25756615/burial-council-blasts-state.
121. Id.
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123. See generally Nedd & Abad, supra note 112.
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they’re disturbed that life force is cut off. That’s the basic understanding. This is
not invented tradition in that sense.
To move them is to disturb, to injure, the ancestors and the traditions
themselves. In the present, the families, the ‘ohana say they have been injured
because they are the inheritors of that tradition. But also because they fought for
what they regard as a good law, some 20 years ago, and now their due process is
being violated.
That hurts, to have bought into the democratic system as indigenous people,
to see it succeed for 20 years and then to suddenly work against them is the kind
of injury we’re dealing with.
Two distinctions I want to cover moving forward. I mentioned that the burial
law has a couple categories. Two of the most important are previously known
burials or inadvertent discoveries. The former finding triggers the jurisdiction of
the burial councils, these groups that have the native Hawaiian advisers on them.
And the latter category enables the state and developers to proceed without
consulting the burial councils.
This is what’s happening lately. The state has just said, “No, in most cases
we’re dealing with inadvertent discoveries.” The problem is they’re not using the
archaeological inventory survey provision of the law that says the first thing that
happens in development is a survey of the land to talk about the likelihood of
known burials.
Also they’re not consulting people who would know the oral tradition of the
land to say if that’s the oral tradition, give us this information that might be
actionable. Basically, this amounts to an end around the most important part of
the law.
This is precisely what happened in this case. The church and the state seem
to have colluded. They did not conduct or publish an archaeological inventory
survey, never mind that it’s a burial ground, and did not engage the burial
council, did not seek their advice. The other distinction that matters here is
between a cemetery and a burial ground. A short answer is it’s both.
As with many colonial settings, the church was built upon a Native Hawaiian
sacred site. The church cemetery sits on top of the burial ground. The burial
ground is larger than the cemetery so it’s both. Cemetery law applies, but state
124
burial law also applies.
The state, however, has been extremely equivocal on this point. At times,
they’ll say, “No this is a cemetery,” and that cemetery law applies therefore the
church can move the remains at will. Other times they say, “Well, OK even if it’s
not a cemetery what we’re dealing are inadvertent discoveries,” and then the state
can still make the decision without consulting the burial council. But as you can
see it’s hard to have it both ways. It’s hard for it to be a cemetery and for these
remains to be inadvertent discoveries. What this inconsistency triggered for many
124. 25 U.S.C. § 3001.
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members in the Native Hawaiian community was just a frustration that the law
125
was being avoided and that human remains were being moved as a result.
What I want to talk about are the two pathways people in the community
have followed to deal with this issue. The first being common in such situations
out of protests, showing up at the church. I’m about to show you a video of
protest saying, “This is a violation of our tradition.” Media presentations, news
stations, radio stations, other forms of social mobilization. Direct protests.
The other path has received far less attention, but I think it matters much
more in this case, and it’s policing administrative law. Native Hawaiians showing
up at state meetings and saying, “Are you following the Sunshine laws, are you
following Robert’s Rules of Order, do you have a quorum?”
The nittygritty of process all the way up to, “By the way did you ask the
church to submit archaeological inventory survey?” Just every fine point right up
to the big points, being there at every single meeting and then when necessary,
filing law suits saying, “The process has been violated.”
In the larger framing of this project, I theorize that relationship between more
dramatic episodes of protests and more mundane episodes of policing process,
that I regard this at least equally important. How these work together dialectically
to sustain the Native Hawaiian movement today. Let me show you just a very
brief example of the kind of protest I’m speaking of [video footage shown] . . .
I just wanted to give you an example of how visceral and intense that sort of
protest is, and it really does draw attention. The question is what does it do? It
draws attention, that’s important of course. But what it’s doing more is protest in
another key. People like Dana N one Hall filed a lawsuit. She knows this law
very well, she’s been on a burial council on Maui for 17 years. She helped draft
aspects of its provisions, and finally she has an ancestor buried at the church.
You can see her language, it’s all about due process and the violation of due
process, and the way the burial law is not followed. She has pursued this, it went
through the first district court and she was denied standing. The appeals court in
Hawaii reheard the case and affirmed her position, and it’s been remanded to the
first circuit, particularly with reference to her claims about how the burial law
126
provisions, or archaeological inventory survey, should work.
This is Dana here, on the occasion of her winning a cultural preservation
award from the State of Hawaii. There’s an irony there to. She gets awarded from
the state for preserving culture, and yet she must challenge the state to make sure
they preserve culture.
. . . This is testimony before the Office of Hawaiian Affairs in 2011 on the
same matter, talking again about process. She wanted the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs to chime in, to do something, to say, “You are in effect our tribal entity,

125. See generally Nedd & Abad, supra note 112.
126. See generally Hall v. Dep’t of Land & Natural Res., No. SCWC-12-0000061, 2013 WL 6271902
(Haw. Dec. 4, 2013).
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speak for the ancestors, speak for us, speak for process.” . . This is all about the
church claiming that these are inadvertent discoveries, are unknown burials.
She’s scandalized and she talks about the hurt and pain our people have endured.
This is injury at that scale, of tradition over time.
. . . Thinking about injuries in this kind of a context, we need to talk about
remedies. Three seem to be in place right now, and I’ll talk about both of these
more in my paper.
First is the injunction I mentioned, that’s holding right now. Once the first
circuit court begins to review the case a new injunction will need to be filed, but
the signs are good. Also the appeals court said, “When the first circuit reviews it,
they will need to follow the Nāone Hall’s recommendations that she is right, her
127
reading of the burial law is correct.” That the state and the church did to an end
around the law and that has to be rectified. That’s just a huge victory because it’s
about the standing of the law. It’s not just about this case.
Then finally Dana Nāone Hall and her attorneys invoked something called
“The private attorney general doctrine,” in the State of Hawaii. This is, you
probably know this much better than I do, it’s a doctrine that says if a matter is
sufficiently significant, it matters to enough of the public, and the state’s not
doing something about it, citizens can come forward to make this kind of a case,
and be awarded fees in certain circumstances.
The court awarded fees from the church to Dana Nāone Hall but they
claimed that the state is immune from such claims itself, about which Georgio
128
Agamben and others might have interesting things to say. What’s the future for
these sets of human remains, the 600 iwi kupuna ? They’re in a basement in the
church, so we just won’t know until the Oahu Island Burial Council receives
jurisdiction and then acts on it. Their tendency over time has been to follow
tradition, which is to have the remains be in situ, that is in place. Put them back
in the ground, forget your building, we’re sorry that’s the more likely outcome.
But political forces being what they are, who knows?
Another remedy in the past that the state has pushed for, is a new site, to set
aside a special new burial ground that will be protected in perpetuity. Native
Hawaiians are anxious about that for a variety of reasons, the obvious one being
that it sets a precedent. That any development site, people can say, “Well, the Ini
Kapuna can just as well be moved.” They don’t want to go down that path.
Recently legislation has been put forward in Hawaii that the island of
Kaho’olawe, which you may know is not occupied by anybody: it used to be
129
used as bombing range by the U.S. Navy. It has been returned to Native
Hawaiians for their quasi-sovereign use. Some people have said, in cases like
127. See Hall v. Dep’t of Land & Natural Res., 290 P.3d 525, 537 (Ct. App. 2012) aff’d, No. SCWC-120000061, 2013 WL 6271902 (Haw. Dec. 4, 2013).
128. The Hawaiian Supreme Court found that Hall could not be awarded attorneys’ fees because the state
had not waived sovereign immunity. Hall, No. SCWC-12-0000061, 2013 WL 6271902, at *3.
129. S.B. 320, 27th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2013).
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this, what about using the island as a burial ground? To which some Hawaiians
responded: first, religiously if you’re not from Kaho’olawe you have no business
being there dead or alive. Second of all, this really amplifies the problem we
were just talking about, “Now it’s OK to develop any site--just dig up the bones
and move them to Kaho’olawe and no one knows anyhow?” Hardly a good
result.
But what’s interesting is it’s been represented in the media as a victory for
Native Hawaiians that the island should become a burial sanctuary. These
countervailing tensions in the media and the public are interesting to think about.
A few closing thoughts. Much of this I’ve covered. The key issue here is that
from some Native Hawaiian burial activists’ perspective, it’s a good law. It’s not
a question of fixing law or getting a new law on the books, it’s a question of
administration and due process.
Finally, the notion of motion through friction that I started with. I’m not
saying it’s a good thing that Native Hawaiians and the church, and the state are
fighting. But I would say that a lot of interesting aspects of tradition are being
vitalized in the process, and as a scholar of religion that’s what I do, I look at
those moments. I would say that one result is that these struggles are producing,
in fact, better laws and better process, that’s clear and obvious.
The third point I’d say is also really important. That this kind of friction
motivates sharper articulations of tradition. That there’s a lot of cultural learning
going on here, and debate and reassessment of tradition, and people are saying,
“What matters to us now, how do we articulate our Hawaiiness in this moment,
and how will that carry us forward, that we’re really seeing it alive.” To me that’s
just fascinating. This is also true of disputes within the Hawaiian community. But
that’s another paper. . . .
Rasmussen, Associate Professor of Political Science, Interim Director of
Graduate Studies, University of Delaware A Single Trait: Animal Injuries,
Legal Trusts, and Non-Human Personhood.
RASMUSSEN: I want to begin with an injury narrative of Tommy, who is a
26‑year‑old male living in a trailer park in upstate New York. An activist group
filed a writ of habeas on Tommy’s behalf, arguing that he was being denied his
liberty and due process in violation of Romar, on the basis of one small
130
characteristic. That characteristic happens to be that Tommy is a chimpanzee.
I think this is an interesting case and they make an interesting argument, that
legal persons are not necessarily human. . . . they filed specifically in the State of
New York, because of case precedent that allowed individuals to file writs on
behalf of enslaved persons, who are not fully human under the law. I want to
130. For a fuller accounting of the case, see Nonhuman Rights Project Homepage, NONHUMAN RIGHTS
PROJECT, http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2015), where they have compiled the
legal documents associated with the case; see also Charles Siebert, Should a Chimp Be Able to Sue Its Owner?,
N.Y. TIMES ( Apr. 23, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/27/magazine/the-rights-of-manand-beast.html?_r=0.
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suggest there’s something interesting going on here with this idea of legal
personhood . . . that the subject is being conceived here in ways that it challenges
some of the conventional ways of thinking, both in terms of animal rights and
rights more generally.
. . . I’m going to talk about two particular injury narratives here. The first of
which is Tommy, who was one of several chimps who was included in this
particular case. The non‑human animal rights project chose to move ahead with
this particular case, after the National Institutes of Health made a decision to end
almost all testing on primates generally, but especially on chimpanzees, because
they were seen as simply too analogous to human beings. Most of those
chimpanzees have been relocated to primate sanctuaries.
This case was filed on behalf of Tommy and several other chimpanzees that
were living in private zoos, or in private facilities. The argument is [that] these
131
chimpanzees should be freed in order to be relocated to primate sanctuaries . . .
I’m going to talk about a second injury narrative and that is of a pit‑bull,
appropriately named Johnny Justice. Johnny was 1 of the 32 dogs who were
seized from “Bad Newz Kennels”, which was the dog trading operation that was
famously bankrolled and partially operated by Michael Vick, who at the time was
a quarterback of the Atlanta Falcons, and of course it got a lot of attention. The
fate of the Vick dogs is rather interesting in that, as a part of the criminal case,
Vick was forced to pay restitution of approximately $900,000 for the dogs. That
was put into a trust that was overseen by a legal guardian, who was able to make
a decision about what would happen to the dogs. Two of them were put down
due to behavioral or health issues, and the rest were relocated to animal rescue.
132
Some of them, like Johnny, were re‑homed.
. . . I want to suggest that this [approach to the Vick dogs] fits into a broader
shift to [a] focus on vulnerability and injury, rather than thinking about animal
rights in terms of whether or not animals are appropriately rights‑bearing, [or] if
they are analogous enough to human beings or to certain groups of human
beings. In many ways, this is not an entirely novel argument [as we can see] from
Jeremy Bentham’s famous utilitarian case for the care of animals. He said the
133
important question is not whether or not they can think, but can they suffer?
There is a significant body of literature now focusing on this notion of
vulnerability and a sense of shared vulnerability, not only recognizing the
vulnerability and injury to animals, but thinking about the ways in which that

131. Michael Mountain, Appeals Court Sets Date for First Chimpanzee, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT (Sept.
12, 2014) http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2014/09/12/appeals-court-sets-date-for-first-chimpanzee-lawsuit/.
132. For a first-hand account of this process see Rebecca J. Huss, Lessons Learned: Acting as a
Guardian/Special Master in the Bad Newz Kennels Case, 15 ANIMAL L. 69 (2008).
133. JEREMY BENTHAM AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, n.122
CLARENDON PRESS (1879).
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challenges the human/animal boundary . . . You see that in work by folks not
134
specifically focusing on animals, like Martha Fineman. . .
Many of these arguments rest on this idea of a sense of shared responsibility
towards these particular subjects and thinking about rights more in terms of that
135
responsibility than the ability of subjects in order to make claims. Specifically,
I would suggest one of the unique features of many of these argumentsC[of]
especially someone like Derrida who . . . talks about this notion of
vulnerability—[is that it] that enables us to recognize the singularity of cases.
Instead of lumping animals together into a category of things that suffer, Derrida
argues that thinking [about] vulnerability relative to animals can highlight a sense
136
of the singularity of the specific kinds of suffering of animals.
. . . [I]t is no accident that these happen to be two cases in which the animals
are given names. We know them by names as opposed to “Pit bull number six.”
It’s interesting that the legal cases specify the nature of injuries to these animals
in very specific ways. In the case of Johnny Justice, the legal case not only
catalogued all of the various forms of physical pain that was experienced by
these particular dogs in the dog fighting operation in training the dogs, but also
mentioned the denial of human affection and socialization with other canines as a
particular form of injury to these dogs, which is one reason why they were re‑
137
homed in animal sanctuaries.
In the case of Tommy, the legal argument focused less on Tommy’s physical
pain, though he continued to experience a great deal of physical deprivation, but
[instead on] an argument that chimpanzees . . . are social creatures and that
Tommy was actually being denied something that was very specific to him and to
138
his particular species. I want to raise three very specific concerns about the
kinds of arguments that are being made here, in spite of a shift away from a
particular form of autonomous, rights‑bearing subjectivity.
The first of these is that this is or must be seen within the context of an
expanded realm of state and regulatory power under the bio‑political
management of life. This is about the insertion of animals into broader circuits of
control more generally. . . . This increasing legal regulation of the conditions
under which animals are living, in which they are reproducing, in which they are
doing all of these things, are inserted into broader networks of, for instance, the
rise of veterinary science, public health regimes, all sorts of circuits of the

134. Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20
YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1, 1 (2008); Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State,
60 EMORY L.J. 251 (2010).
135. See Fineman, supra note 134, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM at 1-2.
136. Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow), 28 CRITICAL INQUIRY 369, 396
(David Wills, trans., 2002).
137. See generally Huss, supra note 132.
138. Siebert, supra note 130.
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139

management of life. Within this, of course, are important ways of thing about
or framing what kinds of animal injuries matter and under what conditions . . .
The second point I wanted to make is that we can’t look at these cases
outside of understanding and thinking through the ways that a right to authority
over animals is also, in many cases, a reiteration of different forms of human
hierarchy, and those who are seen as engaging in proper governance of animals.
In the case of Tommy, this becomes very evident. In the petition that’s filed,
there’s a lot of emphasis on scientific authority and its ability to tell us about
140
injury to animals and proper treatment.
Of course, they draw very heavily on the work of primatologists and
biologists, articulating an argument about the capacities for chimpanzees. . . [and
that] the individuals running the zoo . . . have no official training for dealing with
141
primates.
The case of Jonny, in many ways, makes this even more evident in terms of
who is seen as having proper authority or the ability to govern animals. . . . There
were petitions filed by the Humane Society of the U.S. and the People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals who argued that the dogs ought to be put down
because of what they’d been through, that it would be more humane to do so.
They were seen as legitimate authorities over the life or death of these animals,
142
even though the guardian did not eventually side with them.
. . . There was [also] a sense in which proper treatment of animals is seen as
legitimating one’s humanity. In this particular case, these individuals were very
much dehumanized as a consequence of treatment of the dogs. What we see here
is, their inability to engage in proper governance of animals was used as an
143
excuse what were a construction of them as less than human . . .
[There also] remains a question [of] whose injuries become legible and in
what ways?
. . . [The] focus on specific animals [] trigger[s] affect. Jonny Justice was a
very photogenic dog, Tommy was a very human‑looking chimpanzee. [This]
triggers affect in a particular kind of way because we can attach to the
individuality of these animals while we give them names. This motivates the
sense of affect about their injury.
Part of the problem here is the way in which it prevents us from thinking
through, more broadly . . . While it moves us away from a model of asking, “Are
these rational subjects, whose rights claims we recognize,” it redraws the
boundaries of power into thinking about what conceptions of injuries prevail,
what kinds of injuries do we recognize. I would suggest this has stakes, not only
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See The Nonhuman Rights Project Homepage, supra note 130, where they have compiled the legal
documents associated with the case; See also Siebert, supra note 130.
142. See Huss, supra note 132, at 81.
143. Id. at 80-85.
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for thinking through the issue of animal injury, but also, obviously, in terms of
thinking through some of those relationships of power amongst human animals
as well . . .
S. Lochlann Jain, Associate Professor of Anthropology, Stanford
University “Cancer Injuries.”
JAIN: I’m going to go into a couple of the issues I delve into in my book
144
called “Malignant.” The book provides a social analysis of cancer—a disease
that I suggest and argue is both everywhere but also nowhere. At the same time
145
as over half of all Americans will be diagnosed with some form of the disease,
the ways that we understand it are remarkably thin, given the thickness of our
experiences with it. Within that, I include, especially, the ways we have for
understanding cancer as an injury with many different causes.
One of the hardest things in talking about cancer, or taking cancer into a
146
research project, is that it’s such a different thing for everybody. A doctor
might say, “Well, it’s obvious, cancer is a set of dividing cells. We can’t cure
147
most advanced cancers, but we’re certainly getting closer.” Even then, the
discussion of what cancer is will be different in a debate about screening than it
will be in a discussion about palliative care. It will be different for a clinician
treating a 90‑year‑old than it will be for somebody looking at a 30‑year‑old and
different again for an expert witness in a courtroom trying to determine if a
specific diagnostic error has any bearing on a patient’s outcome or forecasted
outcome.
A cancer patient, asked what cancer is, might enumerate his or her physical,
economic and social losses or describe the humiliation of losing friends, or the
loneliness of radiation treatment. A cancer survivor might speak of cancer in
148
terms of odds that were beaten, or statistics. Lance Armstrong, as we know
often responded to accusations of using performance-enhancing drugs by
diverting attention, instead, toward his cancer survivorship. For him, human
149
cancer survivorship was, in fact, an identity.
Industrialists interested in developing fracking or other industrial processes
might say, “Well, cancer is everywhere. There is nothing really that we can do
about it.” This claim has been successful in courts where it’s virtually impossible
to gain compensation for exposures to carcinogens, even though, for example, a
plastics executive in the 1960s said that his company would be virtually liable to
the entire U.S. population at some point.

144. S. LOCHLANN JAIN, MALIGNANT: HOW CANCER BECOMES US (University of California Press, 2013).
145. Lifetime Probability of Developing and Dying from Cancer for 23 Sites, 2009-2011, AMERICAN
CANCER SOCIETY, http://www.cancer.org/acs/groups/content/@editorial/documents/document/acspc-044512.
pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
146. LOCHLANN JAIN, supra note 144, at 5-6.
147. Id. at 5.
148. Id. at 30-31.
149. Id. at 6.
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A hospital might advertise cancer as something that they have special insight
150
into.
What I was interested in is the kind of moralism that often adheres to each of
these positions. “I’m a survivor, so I can talk about cancer this way.” That’s what
I was particularly interested in because, to me, that moralism always indicates a
kind of boundary policing in the ways that we can think about things.
Indeed, there is a lot at stake in how we define cancer. There’s lots of money
151
in both causing and treating cancer. There are tons of ideas about progress,
whether it be medical or industrial, and ideas about the ways that we can treat
other humans and in what context. There’s a lot about claims to expertise and
what kinds of claims count.
As an anthropologist, I’ve aimed to understand cancer, not as a noun, but as a
152
nexus of these concerns, economics and experiential concern. I’ve sought out
153
the places at which these definitions of cancer collide. It’s exactly at those
interstices that I think some cultural framing of cancer can be found. When I say
“cancer,” I mean both the disease that kills people and the zone of powerful
154
forces and assumptions that come to form that idea.
I studied cancer for a lot of years before I started this book. Some of you
155
know I’ve written a book called “Injury.” I was particularly interested in that
word; about how a specific injury of cancer slipped through many of the legal
protections we have around defective products. Many of you know that it took
156
decades to have cigarettes recognized as a dangerous product, for example. In
the broader project of this book, I’m completely committed to better
understanding how and why cancer causation is so completely segregated from
cancer treatment in so many debates around oncology, legal debates and so on.
The part that I want to talk to you about today is in vitro fertilization, which
I’ll just call IVF. It refers to a process, as I’m sure you all know, of removing
eggs from a woman’s ovaries, combining them with sperm, and then implanting
the resulting embryo into the same or another woman’s body. I’m particularly
interested here in the question of the people that are known as “egg donors,” for
whom a series of drugs are administered to stimulate the production of extra
eggs.
Donated eggs account for over a quarter of IVF live births, even though only
157
about 12 percent of IVF procedures use them. That means that donated eggs

150.
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account for about 3 in every 200 births in the United States. Still, the practice
underpinned the viability of this multi‑billion dollar industry, whose success
159
would be too low without these donated eggs. Interestingly, donors are asked to
undergo a medical procedure for whom no medical benefit will accrue to, which
raises this really interesting question of cost benefits. Since there’s no benefit for
the donor, there really shouldn’t be any cost either.
I started to do this research into the long‑term effects of hormonal drugs on
these fertile women who become donors. On the one hand, this research was
completely straightforward, because quite simply, no one has tracked the donors
to understand the physical or psychological consequences of donation. In the 20‑
year history of artificial egg extraction, no one ever has. Still the IVF industry
portrays the procedure as generally successful and extremely safe. I started kind
of getting on track with this as a research project one day when I was attending a
support group for women under 40 with cancer.
We found out quite by accident just in the discussion that several of the
women in this group had either been egg donors or had gone through IVF. This
kind of piqued my curiosity because it’s quite a small percentage of breast
cancers that happen for women under 40, and yet it’s a very aggressive disease
with very little research on this sub‑category. I became curious about why the
practice remains so common, and why there’s still virtually no research on the
practice.
The use of hormones for agriculture and medicine is not at all new; it’s been
used since the early 1930s for everything from fattening livestock to stunting the
160
growth of girls that were considered to be too small. This history of synthetic
hormones has been documented and includes the purposeful withholding of
correlations between hormone use and cancer by doctors who didn’t want to
161
worry their patients in the 1960s. Still, estrogen and progesterone are
considered to be the core natural messengers of femininity and masculinity, and
162
have been some of the most widely used drugs in the history of medicine.
Hormones are central to the functioning of the endocrine system. They
163
control growth, mood, and the messaging required for reproductive cycles.
Here’s how they’re used in IVF egg extraction. In the first phase of egg

158. Id. at 129.
159. Id.
160. Nancy Langston, Modern Meat: Synthetic Hormones, Livestock, and Consumers in the Post-WWII
Era 2-3 (Sept. 28, 2010) (unpublished colloquium paper) (available at http://www.yale.edu/agrarianstudies/
colloqpapers/05langston.pdf).
161. LOCHLANN JAIN, supra note 144, at 131.
162. Id.; see also Biology: Women: Neither As Hot or Passive as Once Thought, PROBLEMS WITH
GENDER (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.aquestionofexistence.com/Aquestionofexistence/Problems_of_Gender/
Entries/2011/9/26_Biology__Women__neither_as_hot_or_passive_as_once_thought.html.
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extraction called hyper‑stimulation, doctors serially administer three potent
164
hormonal drugs to encourage the development of extra eggs.
The brain processes these synthetic hormones as if they’d been produced by
165
the person’s own body to magnify certain aspects of the reproductive cycle.
First, the gonadotropin we’re using is a hormone agonist as self‑administered
daily, for one to two weeks. You give yourself a needle for that. That blocks the
pituitary function and creates this temporary menopause, which then enables the
physician to sync the donor’s ovulation with that of the woman who will receive
the embryo.
Lupron is currently the most popular of these drugs. It was initially approved
166
for the palliative care of prostate cancer. It continues to be used despite an
ongoing criminal investigation into its fraudulent marketing, the falsification of
data, numerous settlements for price fixing, and findings of significant damaging,
167
irreversible effects. It’s used, as you can assume, off label. That is, without
FDA approval for this particular use.
168
Second, gonadotropin is injected. This is a drug normally used to promote
fertility in women who have a deficiency of the hormone. In fertile women, this
overdose of the drug is used to trigger the ovary and the pituitary, to develop
169
several egg‑containing follicles. A third injection at this time forces an extreme
ovulation with the goal of producing several eggs, which are then removed with a
170
171
long needle. Some 120,000 cycles of IVF are completed in the US each year.
No one has really good records on exactly how many cycles are done. The FDA
doesn’t regulate the process even though most people who undergo it assume it
does.
It’s in this area that’s kind of medical. The people who do it are dressed in
white coats and so on, and yet kind of not medical. It’s clearly not for improving
health or giving any medical kind of treatment. Clinics and spokespeople nearly
uniformly communicate the lack of data on egg donation or hormones, as
172
evidence that no risks exist. It’s easy to say, “There aren’t any reported risks in
173
undergoing this process.” When, in fact, no research has been done . . . . I’ll
give you one example of how studies tend to be reported . . .

164. Mayo Clinic Staff, In Vitro Fertilization: What You Can Expect (Jun. 27, 2013), http://www.mayo
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168. Mayo Clinic Staff, supra note 164.
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A 2012 study found that the risks of breast cancer for those who had taken
hormonal drugs for IVF at a young age actually increased by nearly 60 percent
174
after 16 years. Most of the people in that demographic were still under 40. A
Reuters report based on this study, after saying something like that, cited this
group, the ASRM, which is a self‑proclaimed interdisciplinary group of fertility
experts that represent IVF clinics, as claiming that this study should actually
reassure women since IVF overall is not associated with an increased risk for
175
development of cancer. You can see how the rhetoric around safety is very
much disguised in them.
There are many interesting features of the IVF phenomenon that I examined
in trying to figure out how this question of health dimensions has been so
completely elided. One of them is this question of donor recruitment.
Recruitment pamphlets are these really bizarre kinds of archives because they
have to try and get women to go through this really quite invasive procedure for,
again, no benefit to themselves. They often to turn to this rhetoric of “the magic
of reproduction,” where you can be involved in something that is so much bigger
than yourself, or that donation can be an act of humanitarianism.
One pamphlet, for example, turns this rather frightening and intrusive event
of donation, that is to say, making your way to an office, sitting in the waiting
room, dealing with strangers, being poked and prodded, giving yourself
injections, having numerous blood tests that are involved into one that, “Many of
176
our donors say has been one of their most rewarding experiences.”
It’s impossible to believe that some of the testimonials that are cited are
actual, so perfectly do they address every concern that a woman might have. For
example, if a potential donor were concerned about the drugs which you take,
one pamphlet cites one woman ostensibly as having said, “It was exciting to see
my body respond to the treatments as I daily got closer to giving my recipient the
177
opportunity to bring a new life into the world.”
My research didn’t turn up any donor information that discussed the fact that
178
no long‑term health research has been done. Even the word “donor” actively
misrepresents the exchanges at play in the gamete market. Of all the ethical and
practical considerations attending egg extraction many of the most vibrant
debates turn on this issue of reimbursement and of payment. The ethicists often
179
fret over this commodification of human life.
But this is a really false distinction, I would assert, between gifting and
commerce, and it’s also common in organ exchange, for example, because it
confuses a really critical point. That is, that even when the gamete is freely given,
174.
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the doctors, the nurses, the moneylenders, the accountants, pharmaceutical
companies, lawyers, and many others profit from the commercialization of
180
gametes in this for‑profit event of IVF.
Another point is that, despite the temptation to think of these hormones as
safe because our bodies already produce them, the contemporary use of synthetic
hormones in no way augments any kind of natural ovulation process. As is true
with many other kind of supplements, including vitamins, just because a body
produces a substance doesn’t make it safe.
This is particularly interesting in this case because, to my horror at least, a
more so‑called “natural” state for women of reproductive age may well be that of
being pregnant, in fact. Not giving birth is a known risk for breast and ovarian
cancer since the hormones released during ovulation overload the hormone
181
receptors in certain tissues.
Pregnancy in fact gives a break of approximately nine months per child to
these overloads, so over the course of two to four decades, these breaks add up.
In other words, without the hormone vacations the pregnancy brings, the
overloaded hormone receptors can create malignancies. The link between
hormones and cancers has many consequences, but two I’ll talk about here. One
is that the reason that studies largely show that women who undergo IVF and
then get pregnant, that is to say not donor women, did not have overall higher
rates of cancer. These studies are often used as if they cover donors, as well,
which, of course, they don’t.
Then second is the reason many experts attribute the recent small decline in
breast cancer mortality to the decline in the use of HRT in post‑menopausal
182
women. I’m sure you all know that drug companies promoted the HRT for
decades for reducing hot flashes, weight gain, heart disease, and as a cure all for
basically all of the problems of aging, reduced muscle mass, skin tone, memory,
and so on. They did so without any evidence that HRT could, in fact, affect all
these issues.
In 2010, as I’m sure you all know, 50 years after the introduction of HRT,
enough convincing information was found against Pfizer that juries awarded
millions of dollars in punitive damages to plaintiffs indicating reckless disregard
for women’s health in selling the drug without warnings or ethical study. Since
then, more than 9,000 other women have also sued Pfizer. Some plaintiffs have
shown that Wyeth knew the dangers of hormone replacement therapy well before
the women’s health initiative found that it caused increased rates of cancer,
stroke and other health problems.
In other cases, Pfizer was able to argue that cancer has many causes and,
therefore, couldn’t be traced specifically to its products, which, of course, is a
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huge problem in thinking about cancer litigation, the timeline and the very
general injury of cancer versus the very specific problems of exposure. In my
book, I argue that this has huge consequences for the way Americans understand,
live with and die of cancer.
. . . Before I finish, I would just make one more point about the kinds of
blending of interests and social values that I think have enabled the invisibility
and the lack of research on egg donorship. They include families and values of
reproduction and so on. But there is also this anxiety about the relationship
among birth control, IVF, family formation and abortion.
By coincidence, I think, the earliest attempts at IVF took place in New York
and in the UK, around the same time of the aftermath of the 1973 U.S. Supreme
183
Court case on abortion. There’s an interesting kind of correspondence there
where pro‑choicers worried that regulating IVF based on concerns for future
children’s health, for example, would lead down a slippery slope by setting a
precedent for valuing the fetus’ right to life over a woman’s right to choice.
That’s, of course, at the core of the abortion debate. In this view, any public
debate on IVF practices would reopen uneasy questions around abortion.
Similarly, a consistent pro‑life position would require that no freezing or
destruction of embryos take place, and that’s a seemingly unavoidable aspect of
IVF. Given the implications of that, perhaps this hush code over the last three
decades of IVF isn’t really that surprising. The industry and the people who
undergo the procedures have interests in the silence and they wield considerable
economic power. For example, the average birth mother undergoing IVF is
white, married, in the top percent income bracket, educated, 36 years old and
she’s undertaking a highly visible, acceptable and widely advertised procedure.
. . . . But the seemingly neutral framework encourages us to make a number
of misguided assumptions, too. The idea that reproduction is a natural and
healthy social and medical right. That science can help this process along. That
the doctors who perform these procedures work primarily in the interest of
health, rather than out of the intellectual curiosity or financial gain. That egg cells
should be free or cheap, the hormones do not pose hazards, and that unborn
children will not have certain rights to know their biological parents or put at risk
for prematurity or other health risks.
The cluster of contradictory ideas here can sometimes crowd out the active
debates about each of these complex points. In addition to an astonishing fact,
really, that neither clinics nor governments in the US track the main players in
IVF, the genetic parents, the birth parents or, even, the babies. Though couched
in terms of the well‑being of families, IVF is really a barely regulated billion
dollar market. Unlike comparable commodity‑based systems, the stock market,
futures, meat production, this one exists without the usual legal or regulatory
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protections against injury or the expected guarantees of the product’s or the
contract’s quality. Very few plaintiffs sue for egregious errors involving IVF.
People find it galling to sue for a poorly designed product when that product is
your baby.
These details of IVF embody the spectacular promise of science and
technology and the extremes of marketing and profit‑based medicine make IVF a
perfect contemporary case study for understanding the ways that cancer slips
through virtually every means we have for making injuries visible, for tracking
down and compensating for them and easing the substantial burden of future
injuries. It also offers a diagnosis of how we’ve configured notions of choice,
children and health.
Yoshitaka Wada, Professor of Law, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan.
“Expert and Patient Injury Narratives in Japan.”
WADA: As everybody can see, I have a neck injury. It’s not by accident.
According to David [Engel]’s definition, it’s a natural injury. After the morning
discussion, I’m thinking of suing the manufacture of my chair . . . It’s a very
interesting topic, but today I make a presentation about a different theme, about
the process and the politics of constructing the meaning of injury after an adverse
event in a hospital setting. When the [] adverse event happen[s], the patient
usually thinks that it is [an] injury caused by a physician’s negligence or some
malpractice. Many times, from the perspective of the physicians, it is just the
natural result caused by [a] complication or something.
The idea of injury is very different, because physicians live in professional
cultures and ordinary people live in another everyday culture . . . Of course, the
lawyers are [also] strange people who. . . . have a special way of thinking. There
are many conflicting perspectives and narratives [that] come into the scene after
the medically adverse event. I think the important idea is that of
incommensurability. . . . Anyway, I think it is impossible to reach . . . complete
agreement, because each actor lives in a different culture. In the area where
incommensurability exists, we can see some power struggles between domination
and resistance.
As a theoretical framework I borrowed the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu and
184
Michel de Certeau, a French thinker. I picked up the example as analogy about
languages. Of course, when we speak in some language, we are bound by the
grammar, vocabulary and expression specific to some language. Each person’s
speech also has its special individual characteristic. This language enables us to
speak, but it also binds our speech. However, each speech act has very special,
particular elements in it. For example, the young generation’s speech uses some
words very different way from the old normal usage of that word.

184. MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE (Steven Rendall, trans., Univ. of
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Maybe, decades later, that kind of very strange young people’s usage may
come out as normal usage. Here is [the] recursive process of binding and
reconstruction. Michel de Certeau found politics inside of this recursive model,
that is, domination and the resistance.
Resistance means a tacit protest. It’s an implicit, hidden resistance,
something like young people’s usage of a word in different way. I borrowed
these ideas to analyze construction of the injury idea after an adverse event.
Let’s see the patient’s construction of meaning of medical injuries. Of
course, it is a typical lay understanding of medical injury based on the common
story of grief and pain. Their idea is sometimes constructed or reinforced by mass
media articles or something like that.
However, the patient’s construction of meaning of the injury is not so simple.
Under the influence of the basic culture—in my case it is Japanese culture—
there [are] some conflicting elements inside of this construction process. For
example, that the monetary compensation is not a good thing for ordinary
Japanese people, even for the victims of medical malpractice, because if you
claim monetary compensation, it means that the person tried to transform the
deaths of the family member to the money. It’s a very bad image.
Japanese people, even the victims, try to avoid talking about monetary
185
compensation. Also, especially in Japan, we have a very small number of
186
lawyers and small number of lawsuits. Traditionally, we have a law‑avoiding
culture. To bring the case to court has a very negative image sometimes.
Therefore, the patient’s construction of the meaning of injury is done in a very
subtle and conflicting matter.
For the healthcare professionals, construction of the meaning of medical
injury also takes place in their professional culture. They find the meaning of
injury not only from scientific medical views on causation, but also from a point
of view shared with other staff as a member of the group. In Japanese culture,
his/her position in the hospital or medical organization has critical influence on
187
the person’s construction of reality.
In Japan, 100 percent of the physicians working in the hospital are employees
of the hospital. At the same time, Japanese medical school professors have a very
strong power even after graduation. Usually, the medical professors keep [the]
power to send the graduates to the local hospital. Local hospitals have to ask the
professor to send a doctor to the facility. The law professor, like me, has no such
power . . .

185. See Robert B. Leflar, Public and Private Justice: Redressing Health Care Harm in Japan, 4 DREXEL
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A professor at a medical school, in Japan, has very strong power. Then each
physician, if they make some mistake or some bad result happened because of the
complication feels responsibility to the patient, to their organization and to his
professor. It’s also a very conflicting matter. The legal system is usually
considered to be a means to overcome this conflict between patients and
188
physicians.
However, from our viewpoint, [the] legal system may work as a means to
suppress parties’ discourses. It is a domination of legal discourse both on patient
perception and on the physicians’ perceptions. It is an example that Japanese law
defines that compensation as monetary compensation. Legal fact-finding is
completely different way from the physician’s idea of medical fact finding. Of
course, for the patient meaning of the injury and remedy are also different from
189
[the] legal way of thinking.
As I said, the patient wants a sincere apology or an explanation of the truth.
Japanese victims of medical malpractice usually do not think monetary
compensation is [the] primary purpose of suing. However, [the] court system
cannot give this kind of remedy to the patient. It means even after court
judgment, incommensurability between parties remains.
We turn to the resistance phenomenon. One way of physician’s resistance is
defensive medicine. Physicians try to avoid being sued by avoiding risky
treatments or operations.
Another way of resistance is escape from risky practice. The hospital
physicians quit the hospital and they open a small clinic, as they have to face
with more serious, accordingly risky, hospitals. In addition, young medical
students tend to avoid risky departments of medicine. For example, the data show
the number of investigations by police on medical malpractice as [a] criminal
190
case rapidly increased from 1999. Obstetrics is the most risky and easy to be
sued department; many OBG physicians moved to the more safe areas. This is a
191
kind of resistance to the severe legal sanction to the physicians.
Another thing that they tried is establishing a new dispute resolution
mechanism to reduce conflicts with patients and to reduce the number of
litigation. It is the in-house mediator system, where a person trained in mediation
skills takes care of patients just after an adverse event happens. Its purpose is to
satisfy the patient’s need and remedy. Japanese patients do not want to go to
court for monetary compensation. Of course, they need it, but it’s not the first
priority. Sincere apology and adequate and sympathetic explanation are much
192
more important.
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To facilitate that process, they made an in-house mediation mechanism. This
can also be considered as a kind of the law‑abiding resistance. We can find some
changes of the legal system tacitly responding to the resistance from the parties’
side. This data show the number of civil litigation for medical malpractice in
Japan [shows slide].
The number began to increase from 1999 and reached its peak in 2004 when
the number of the civil suits is 1,110. I think it’s very small compared to that in
the United States, but for us, it’s a surprisingly high number. The number of
criminal cases also increased and in 2006 one OBG physician is arrested. It is the
first case [where a] physician is arrested for medical malpractice. After this case,
many hospitals closed [their] obstetric departments and criticized police. Mass
media also any began to emphasize [the] shortage of the doctors and their hard
193
working environment in Japan. Mass media’s change of direction from
physician bashing to reporting of problems in [the] healthcare system must have
had influences on the behavior of court systems.
This data [shows slide] show the percentage of civil court cases that plaintiff
wins. Usually in Japanese civil court, plaintiffs win in almost 90 percent of the
cases. When mass media showed a very severe attitude against physicians, the
plaintiff winning rate reached 40 percent. However, after the 2006 physician
arrested case, it continues to decrease. Now in the medical malpractice area, the
plaintiffs winning rate is very low—from 20 or 30 percent. That is, the court is
influenced by the hidden resistance or mass media’s position. It indicates [the]
courts changed their attitude responding [to] resistance.
One more thing specific to Japanese courts in medical malpractice cases is
[the] percentage of conciliation reached in litigation procedure. Half of the
194
medical malpractice cases finished as conciliation. In conciliation during
litigation judges have no need to decide the meaning of the injury or to find the
negligence and causation. These changes can be understood by my paper’s
framework. Under the influence of physician’s hidden or implicit resistance [the]
legal system also tacitly changed its behavior.
This is just a sketch of my project, and this is not completed. I want to make
some case analysis and also macro and micro level change of court system
analyzing statistics.
...
MICHAEL MUSHENO, DISCUSSANT: What I’d say to start out with is
that these are really fascinating story sketches and the experts of these stories are
before you. I’m not going to particularly try to get inside a particular argument
about a particular subject matter. I’m trying to think about this project as a
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project that’s in formation here. What I really would invite the presenters to think
about is the story that they’re going to tell about other people’s stories or
narratives . . . I have some questions for [you] that maybe will help you further
develop the sketches, which are already very fascinating.
The first question is, how is culture revealed in your study? What marks the
force of culture distinct from other forces that give shape to injury? Here, I’m
trying to get you to think a little bit more [about] . . . where [are] the boundaries
of culture in the way you’re framing the story that you ultimately want to tell, as
this sketch becomes a thicker narrative?
Second question would be: how is injury articulated in your study? Where in
the process of . . . people’s imagining and acting on injury is your study
focusing? We’ve heard a lot about [how] injury is a moving target. . . . that it
moves, for example, across places and spaces. How is injury articulated? . . .
The third question is: how would you depict your mode of inquiry? How, in
other words, are you substantiating the claims that you’re making? Some of the
claims in at least two of the papers are claims about injuries being unique to
place. I’ll come back to that, but how do you know for sure that the kind of
structure of the injury that you’re seeing is truly unique to that place? . . .
Fourth:. . . . how is power manifested through the interplay of culture and
injury? By whom is it being manifested and with what purpose? . . . . How is
culture revealed and what marks the force of culture distinct from other forces? I
think that the studies divide into two.
If you think about narratives, or more particularly stories, you can focus on
the plots, you can focus on the settings, you can focus on the characters, you can
focus on the emotional content of a story or narrative. I think that for Greg’s and
Yoshitaka’s study, the setting is really revealing of the culture. It’s the setting.
There is something unique about Hawaiian indigenous culture. There is
something about Japanese culture at this moment with regard to injury that
you’re trying to speak to. You are making claims of the uniqueness of the culture
in these settings, and yet we have no—and this goes back to a term I found really
interesting in your work, Yoshitaka—is this term of incommensurability. That is
that there is no measure, if you will, articulated measure for which a baseline can
be decided.
. . . . In my thinking right now, in the current form, three of your studies, it
seems to me, are stories really about disputes. It seems to me that injury, in at
least socio‑legal parlance, is about trouble. Or may I even say about trouble in its
formative stage. . . .
Michael McCann: . . . My role is as the Rapporteur. I’m not really sure
exactly what that means, but I think that my goal is to try and construct some
themes out of what we’ve talked about today and comment on them and
comment on some issues that haven’t been raised or to make explicit what has
been implicit. I’m going to do that partly through this talk, and that’s the part
where I’m just going to rap. I’m not going to rap to rhyme, because I don’t have
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time . . . It’s not a strength of mine anyhow. . . I’m not exactly sure what I’m
going to say. I think I know where I’m going to end up . . .
First, let me try and just identify some themes and begin with the most
obvious and then perhaps for the less obvious or the more implicit and make
them explicit. At the heart of what we’ve talked about so far is that injury is a
social construction. What does that mean, you say, that it’s a social construction?
It means that injuries or category of injury refers to events and relationships in
material life but how we construct and make meaning of them, how we talk about
them, how we make sense of them is constructed through conventions that are
developed in specific sites of cultural interaction. We construct injury out of the
material that we learn from cultures.
Injury, as we’re familiar with it, is that which happens to bodies, happens to
cognition psyches, like hate speech, to image and reputation, we learned about
inter‑reputations. Injuries or damage, usually we talk about injuries as damage. I
should say I began where I usually begin any talk, which is with Wikipedia. It
was not in wiki‑dictionary. It wasn’t helpful at all, because it said, “Injury, that
to which happens to an injured person” . . . That’s dictionary talk, and then it
doesn’t do much better after that, it identifies injury with harm. Actually, all the
dictionaries I looked at online, Identified injury only as physical harm, which
seemed to me incredibly narrow. I usually rely heavily on Wiki sources, but I’m
not going to go with that.
When we think about injury as a social construction, which is sort of
categories that we employ, to try and make sense of events. We learn first of all
that injuries can be good and bad. . . . Also, the assessment of actionability,
which is that when we experience an injury which we think is harmful and a
violation of our rights—that we develop a whole series of categories and
understandings—about when we can take action for redress, and how we go
about doing that. That itself is also constructed. . . . We construct when we think
we can take action, when a wrong is a violation of a right that is actionable, and
when it’s not. . . .
. . . To say that injury and the meaning of injury and how we act on injury
[are] socially constructed is also to point to the fact of power. I would like to
emphasize that through almost everything today we could talk about power.
Power in particular because, after all, constructions are products of power. The
meanings and the categories that we use and the tools we use to make meaning
are products of society. A society where certain people have a greater stake than
others and a greater ability to construct and say what really are the authoritative
195
categories that we use.
One thing I would like to emphasize in a lot of the projects today is a little bit
more focus on institutional sites of knowledge production and norm enforcement.
We talk a lot about culture but culture isn’t just freestanding and kind of the air
195. Fineman, supra note 134, 20 YALE L.J & FEMINISM at 3-4.
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we breathe. Culture is made in institutional sites and processes. A little bit more
attention to those various sites where the terms of constructing meaning take
place.
I think . . . first of all, those [sites] that we identify with official formal law
which are not just personal injury law, that’s come up a lot. But, after all, injury
is defined in other domains of law, criminal law, and of course there is often a
connection and overlap between criminal law and civil law in defining injuries.
But also of course administrative regulation or regulatory law which attempts to
regulate the construction of the unnatural world around us and protect the natural
world so as to minimize injuries . . .
. . . But we also want to look at other sites, not just the formal legal
system . . . because, of course, there are lots of other important sites of
knowledge production about issues of injury. Among those that I do a lot of
study regarding is mass media. . . . Trying to make the case many times that mass
media constructs laws much like the official legal system constructs laws. That
the categories that people use in everyday life—negotiating their senses of
responsibilities and rights—are shaped by what they read on TV, what they read
in novels, by what we increasingly see in social media and YouTube, and so
forth.
What is the right and appropriate thing to do, what is an actionable issue,
what is an injury that deserves compensation is shaped by popular narratives that
we consume. We know that actually changes what goes on in the official legal
system. The jurors, for example, are very much shaped by their consumption of
popular culture and often don’t pay attention to what they’re told in the
196
instructions from judges. They act on what David and I in an earlier iteration in
this kind of project called fault lines.
We debated a lot [about using that term] because fault lines are not a legal
category. [But] . . . jurors often used the term fault when they are trying to decide
issues of responsibilities and liability. The popular culture conception of fault
actually supplants the official law in a certain way. Or it becomes law as
practiced, social legal studies would say.
Pay more attention to mass media but also to other sources and sites of
knowledge production, including religion. We heard about religion today.
Science and technocrats, scientific generation of knowledge—all of these come
together. If we want to understand culture we need to look at [it] not just as free
floating norms and ideas, but the sites of production that then come together and
produce the categories which we put to work, and [use to] try to make sense of
injury and which we use and contest in terms of injury. . . . The production of
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knowledge that then helps [us] construct the meaning of injuries. We also have to
recognize that this all involves an unequal exercise of power.
The very first presentation . . . raised the issue on inequality in injury and I
would urge that we keep it very much at the forefront, in that the ways that we
think about injury—what we categorize as injury, is not injury, is good injury, is
bad injury, actionable injury, non‑actionable injury—are all products of an
unequal political system, not just in the US, but everywhere. Every society has an
unequal distribution of power.
Reliance on those categories often continues to reproduce power in ways that
we don’t recognize. To the extent that certain kinds of injuries we experience
that, David Engel showed, we don’t recognize as harmful or actionable, that just
reproduces those relationships over and over and over again.
The production of knowledge has power and the ways in which the reliance
on those produced forms of knowledge reproduces inequality is an issue to which
we should be attentive as scholars to try and make explicit what is often implicit
in social practice.
I would also emphasize, and this has come up before, the relationship
between formal legal norms and informal practices. David Engel early on pointed
out that although lots of people experience injuries, they first of all don’t
recognize them as injuries that are actionable, but even if they do, they rarely
take formal legal action . . . .
Lots of people do take action. They just don’t call a lawyer or call a police
officer and enter into the formal legal system. They work it out on their own or
they go to the local priest or rabbi, or they go to the local gang. Or they mobilize
friends, or they find some way of dealing with an issue by mobilizing, going
through an alternative dispute resolution authority or other forms of power that
can work it out.
We want to look at that interaction of official law that sets the terms of
official categories and the informal forms of negotiation in the shadow of law.
You can always threaten that you’re going to go to court, which gets other
people’s attention so you actually have a useful negotiating process. A lot of
activity that actually takes place quite distant from law—through forms of
knowledge and categories and understandings that are little shaped by official
law.
What is injury about? From a legal perspective, mostly, but also from a
question of power, at the heart contesting injury is about contesting terms of
responsibility, or in the less legal terms, who’s at fault, and who bears liability
for redressing the injuries that were done, and for taking actions that would
reduce the likelihood that those harms are going to be reproduced over time.
What I want to point out about that is the ways in which our conceptions of
injury that are mechanisms of law—personal injury law, tort liability, criminal
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law and the like—are all a part of constructing a society that’s about
197
responsibility.
Construction of injury is about assigning responsibilities to each of us for
how we take actions that affect ourselves and affect others. They are part of those
apparati of law and of disciplinary mechanisms that make us responsible, self‑
governing individuals.
That becomes very important. For example, the difference between good
harm and a good injury and a bad injury partly is whether somebody engages in
action that may pierce the body or which may have an effect on one that one
desires. That’s within my realm of self‑government to determine that I want a
tattoo or I want this kind of surgery or so forth. That makes it a good harm.
But when someone else does it to me and I don’t want it, it’s outside of my
self‑governance and it disrupts or impedes my ability to wield my situation, and
that’s a harmful injury. That’s an injury that we call harm. Partly that dividing
line between good and bad harms is tied to conceptions of responsibility and
governance with individuals over themselves and over their worlds.
It’s also that [which affects] actionability. If we want to make a claim that an
injury was caused to us and that we deserve some sort of compensation or redress
or change in procedures. . . . we have to fit our claims into those terms of
responsibility. This was not my responsibility. This was somebody else’s
responsibility. And we all know what can happen when we take actions. We
know that, “If I do something that’s responsible for somebody else being harmed,
I’m going to have to take responsibility, be accountable for that, perhaps be liable
to pay money,” and so forth. It fits into those mechanisms of self‑governance, of
198
governing each other and governing ourselves in important kinds of ways.
Of course, that issue of responsibility is complicated because it’s tied into
this idea of lumping and part of why people don’t bring suits. . . . [W]e know
from lots of empirical socio‑legal studies, as well as theorizing about topics that
often when people make claims that they have been injured, that they have
claimed that I have certain rights to seek redress when injury is done to me.
When somebody else does something to me that causes a harm that I did not
desire and for which I am not responsible, in making that claim that often marks
one as something less than a fully independent and responsible person because
199
you couldn’t fend off that harm happening to you.
Therefore, you have to go to the state or to a third party, declare your
neediness, that you are less than fully independent and in full control of your life
and you need the help of someone else, which further discounts your claim to be
an independent and self‑governed, rational, autonomous person really capable of
looking out for your interest.

197. LOCHLANN JAIN, supra note 92, at 24-25.
198. See generally Bloom, supra note 67.
199. See generally Engel, supra note 81.
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We see this in discrimination law a lot. When somebody claims
discrimination, somebody discriminated against me and caused injury to me, that
can end up only calling attention to or amplifying the fact that a person of color
or a woman is really not able to fend for oneself and needs a third party, which
makes us less than the qualification of being an independent, self‑governed
individual. That’s often why people don’t claim rights.
It’s not only the deterrence of “it’s costly to pay a lawyer”. It takes a lot of
time. It’s very uncertain to go into a formal legal proceeding where you lose
control over the terms of negotiation to lawyers and the juries and so forth. But
also, you are defined as a victim. You’re a victim.
You will declare your rights by declaring yourself a victim—it is a
contradictory process. . . . By declaring one is a victim, one is wholly
compounding one’s sense of injury as a less than fully deserving rights‑bearing
individual. I’m not totally convinced by the argument, because I think a lot of
times people claim rights and are empowered and, in fact, do really improve their
lives. But there’s always that possibility that one is actually compounding one’s
secondary status in that process.
I think talking about disabilities really brought that idea more clearly into
focus. How do we claim rights to accommodation, how do people with
disabilities claim rights to accommodation in nondiscrimination without further
compounding the stigma of being a person with disabilities? That’s a problem
200
that often comes with almost all rights claiming about injury.
. . . One of the points about social construction is that the labels, the
categories and the forms of understanding about injury change over time. A lot of
people refer to that. We began early on with the story about images of oneself
201
and reputation, how that changes over the 20th Century. We recognize that the
terms and the categories and the forms of constructing the meaning of injury
change over time. But how does that change take place? Some of it takes place
out of aggregations of lots of little, individual changes that are below the screen
that we can see in retrospect; we don’t often see when they’re happening.
A lot of it comes out of political contestation. That’s why some attention as
to who are the parties who engage in political contestation and what kind of
political contestation transforms norms over time—that’s often a very
complicated process . . . I was reading in the paper some time yesterday . . . I’ve
been thinking about a study that one of my graduate students is doing, and has
completed the dissertation. It’s about sexual violence in the Congo, the
Democratic Republic of Congo in South Africa.
What’s interesting about this—here’s where the institutions become
important—South Africa, which has a very progressive constitution which seems
to really emphasize equality, including gender equality, which has a very well
200. See generally Mor, supra note 36.
201. See generally Barbas, supra note 46.
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developed legal infrastructure, and to some degree, a very progressive judiciary,
has a lousy record on gender violence, dealing with gender violence,
202
discouraging, deterring gender violence, prosecuting gender violence.
You contrast that to the Democratic Republic of Congo, which basically
doesn’t even have a state. It has a very underdeveloped state. It’s a war‑torn area.
You would think that would be the last place you would really find progress
made in gender violence. In fact, you do see a lot more that’s happened with
regard to prosecuting gender violence and changing norms about the
203
acceptability of gender violence, especially by men to women.
How does one explain that? What she shows is what happens in South Africa
is that while you have this top layer of secular, formal law, . . . decisions made
about kinship relations and familial relations are delegated to the local customary
chiefs in the provinces. That reproduces old gender norms that sanction or that
dismiss gender violence, not just men against women, but married men against
wives and daughters and so forth, and [they] treat that much less seriously. When
cases are brought, those authorities are just reproduced.
Whereas in Congo, you have this sort of decimation of the culture, a
tremendous amount of violence because of the history of state violence and then
introducing war among tribes. What’s happened is that a whole maze—a
complex network—of NGOs have come in and built a legal system, almost
independent of the state, with these mobile tribunals and actors.
That has provided resources, including material benefits, promises of money,
for redress, for all kinds of harms, including physical harms and medical benefits
and so forth, to women, which provides an incentive. . . . That has dramatically
changed attitudes. There’s a lot of evidence for that, including among men.
That’s where institutions matter. We tend to think, we identify law that deals
with injuries with the state, but in fact, there are other mechanisms that happen.
There’s a lot of strange side effects of that. What’s happened [in the Congo is]
because NGOs offer money to women who claim rape, there’s lots of evidence
that lots of women claim rape when they weren’t raped, because that’s the only
way they can get any kind of medical treatment at all. . . . Men start supporting
the women in bringing claims because they get money that they all benefit from,
so men are very in favor of these changes in certain ways. Now there’s a
countermovement towards stigmatizing the plaintiffs who are bringing cases.
It’s complicated, so it’s not a panacea, but you get fundamental changes.
Institutions matter in that regard. Institutions can change norms and values and
how injuries are imagined, but not in a simple, linear kind of way.
202. See, e.g., Mohamed Seedat, Ashley Van Niekerk, Rachel Jewkes, Shahnaaz Suffla, & Kopano
Ratele, Violence and Injuries in South Africa: Prioritizing an Agenda for Prevention, 375 LANCET 1011 (2009),
available at http://www.savi.uct.ac.za/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Lancet.pdf.
203. Megan Bradley, Sexual and Gender-based Violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo:
Opportunities for Progress as M23 Disarms?, BROOKINGS (Nov. 13, 2013, 2:30 PM), http://www.brookings.
edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2013/11/12-sexual-gender-based-violence-congo-bradley.
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The last point I want to make comes back to this idea of injury is part of the
overall responsibilizing complex of official law and informal social practice.
If we recognize that injury is implicated in structures of power and unequal
power relations, then every time that people contest injury they are not only
contesting the distribution of benefits and the distribution of liability for harms
that take place but they’re also, to some degree, either conforming and
confirming or contesting how we think about legal personhood—that is, the
status of people that claim rights to redress for injury.
A number of the papers have raised issues that go directly to this question
about how focusing on injury isn’t just about who gets what, when, where and
how in an instrumental distributive way, but about how do we imagine who is a
deserving rights‑bearing subject or who can speak for people as deserving rightsbearing rights subjects.
I think about this with regard to Greg Johnson[‘s paper]. That was the last
thing that we focused on. In the Hawaiian case, with regard to people claiming
injuries for ancestors, speaking for ancestors who can’t speak for themselves, but
not as separate souls, but as a continuation of a sentiment developing sense of
communal self, if you will. That disrupts the conception of the autonomous,
independent, individual legal subject that the whole legal system is based on. In
Hawaii, it’s reasonable to do that.
I think disabilities movements . . . I have a particular interest in disabilities
for that same kind of reason . . . people claim rights to accommodation and
against stigmatizing discrimination on the basis, precisely of not being, not fitting
the model of the perfectly, [of a] fully able, independent subject. That’s part of
what raises the challenge, is how to claim rights as self‑governing, autonomous
subjects while recognizing that there’s a disability, something that can get in the
way of making one fully abled.
That’s part of a project of reimagining the injury that’s at stake is not
something less than the fully autonomous, able person, but in fact, equally or
differently abled. The real problem of the injury is not biological and natural, but
is in the socially constructed world. That is a social problem and accommodation
is an obligation we all have.
That raises issues about obligations that we have to each other which, I think,
disrupt or call into question this conception about the autonomous individual.
I saw this most strikingly—this will be the last point—with regard to Claire
Rasmussen’s discussion of animals, where she called attention to the shift from
humans, “The autonomous, adult, self‑governing animals.” . . . Her discussion
about Tommy, the chimpanzee and Jonny Justice, who can be understood as legal
persons even though they’re not humans.
One of the traditional ways we think about the legal subject is that human
that can speak for him or herself—originally, for a long time only himself—as an
autonomous, rational, self‑governing individual who can articulate claims in
terms of the conventional categories of responsibility and liability.
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In the case of animals, whether chimpanzees, which we consider closer to
human, or less, pit bulls, which are not quite so human . . . We’ll get to that in a
second . . . People speaking for them, which suggests that they are not legal
persons, but it’s an interesting idea that’s at least been entertained in court and
204
certainly been advocated before courts.
This, in some ways, disrupts our conception about legal subjectivity, about
responsibilities that we owe to people, in recognizing rights about who has rights,
even if they do not claim rights. It disrupts how we think about these core issues.
What it does is [it] pushes us to think beyond our standard, negative rights
that are very much at the center of the liberal legal tradition and take more
seriously conceptions of positive rights, rights that bind us by collective
obligations and responsibilities to provide everyone that’s part of society with
those resources that really make opportunities to participate in citizen societies
meaningful.
We all take for granted things like education, but it pushes well beyond that
in terms of a whole variety of things, like health care, to even minimum income
for people. It pushes us to recognize some of those categories of international
human rights, about positive socioeconomic rights, which are still quite alien in
the United States.
They’re not just different kinds of rights. They’re grounded in different
conceptions about the legal subjectivity and the responsibilities that we owe to
205
others when we recognize their rights, somebody like that.
I totally agree with the argument . . . This issue is raised especially about
beginning from a baseline of vulnerability, especially by people like Martha
206
Fineman, who has written about “The Vulnerable Subject.”
That’s very problematic because it begins with a kind of negative. It’s a base
point that I think is very difficult, politically, because the most powerful groups
are not going to want to begin from a baseline of someone else, because that’s
going to de‑privilege them in a certain way. I think it’s not the way to begin. The
way to begin is with a positive conception of responsibility that we owe to all—
that we’re interdependent upon, recognize we are interdependent. We are
products of our culture.
Our very sense of power and being depends on learning language and
benefiting from our cultural inheritance. We depend on education that we get,
whether it’s publicly subsidized or privately subsidized, but it’s usually some
combination of both. We’re all interdependent. We’re all in this together. At a
certain baseline, we all owe responsibilities to each other to recognize those
rights, that [are] independent of qualifying as an autonomous being.

204. Siebert, supra note 130.
205. See generally id.
206. See generally Fineman, supra note 134, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1; Fineman, supra note 134, 60
EMORY L. J. 251.
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. . . It’s that disruption of norms that we see in a relationship between a not‑
adult, less than autonomous person, and a dog, a non‑autonomous human, but
also a sense of responsibility and a sense of respect that seems to be to be a
different conception of rights than we see raised by papers and the work of Claire
and people like that.
I’ll finish by saying that in some ways what it reminds me of—many of you
I’m sure have read Patricia Williams wonderful—timeless book “The Alchemy
of Race and Rights.” . . . Patricia Williams who was descended from slaves,
[whose] people were defined as property and not as humans as with rights—[she
says] the task is not to dismiss rights but to reconstruct [them] as the obligations
207
of an expanded universal self.
In other words, we’re not lonely individual selves, we are part of the larger
208
collective self that takes responsibility for all that sustains our shared world.
209
[She says] give rights to animals, to rocks, to trees, something like that. . . . All
those things we’re interdependent with, we need to learn to grant respect and a
sense of responsibility to, and that’s a way of rethinking what rights are. That’s
210
the alchemy she says that we need to go through.
. . . That’s what I see, thinking about injury gets us to some of those
fundamental questions . . .
IV. REMEDIES FOR THE TRAUMA AND BRUTALITY OF INJURIES
Maurice Stevens, Associate Professor of Comparative Studies, Ohio State
University
Yukiko Koga, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Hunter College
Khiara Bridges, Associate Professor of Law and Anthropology, Boston
University
Raquel Aldana, Professor of Law, University of the Pacific McGeorge
School of Law

Maurice Stevens, Associate Professor of Comparative Studies, Ohio
State University. The Trauma Resiliency Model as Biopolitical
Apparatus.
STEVENS: . . .
Over the past decade or so, a theme has slowly surfaced in my work, like a
bruise or the knob of a scar beneath the skin. Over time I’ve explored this
emergent question, feeling for the sense of quest within it, and listening into the
quiet ways it has announced itself. I trusted intuitions. I’ve followed the guidance

207. PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 164 (Harvard Univ. Press, 1992).
208. See generally id.
209. Id. at 165. (“Give them [rights] to trees. Give them to cows. Give them to history. Give them to
rivers and rocks.”)
210. Id.
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of hunches, and I’ve looked through my peripheral vision, grasping for that
which likes to slide away consistently, that which is hard to hold and even harder
to represent with any deep sense of success.
Injury and what we make of it, suffering and how we elaborate it, memory
and how we manage it. These have been my sites of inquiry and questioning and
listening.
Over time, I’ve come to suggest that theories of trauma in the West primarily
function in the main as apparatuses that constitute and operationalize a very
specific form of subjectivity in the wake of events or experiences that disrupt or
interrupt the putatively even flow of self‑understanding or conceptualizing of the
211
self. I refer to this process as “traumatization.”
The image of the damaged social fabric is often called upon to describe
injury that encompasses collectivities. It’s also interesting for the sense of
calamity it carries. Something that was once whole and seamless now lies in
pieces, begging their repair or release.
Thinking in terms of a torn social fabric, wrecked or ruined systems, scarred
ecologies or broken bodies depends upon and also reproduces crucial oppositions
in the hierarchies they represent— victim/survivor, perpetrator/victim,
wounded/whole, innocent/jaded, untouched/ravaged, damaged/repaired and so
on. These oppositions also pre‑suppose the temporality of collapse. Not only was
there once a seamless and perfect subject or functioning set of relations or
unsullied landscape, but there’s always also the sense of the time before
catastrophe, a time that while not now— indeed, perhaps because not now, offers
visions of how a mended and better present moment might look.
There’s also the promise of a time after now, a casting forward of our
nostalgia into a futurity of possibility. Hope is the ruling signifier there. We
imagine that this now, our unbearable now, can be surpassed. It can be over
212
passed and it can be somehow avoided.
I want to suggest that this is one aspect that renders the valuation of injury
and trauma and some of our rapidly institutionalizing responses to trauma in sites
of catastrophe, disaster and conflict so important. Reflecting on how we step over
the unbearable social now, precisely by insisting on a very specific biological
now in post disaster interventions is what I’ll be talking about for the remainder
of the discussion.
I’ll examine one mode of response to catastrophic contexts. One form of
evaluative engagement that enacts traumatization. In particular, I’ll review the
conceptualization and the application of the trauma resiliency model training
technology, and will do so with two goals in mind.

211. See Maurice Stevens, From the Past Imperfect: Towards a Critical Trauma Theory, LETTERS,
(Letters: Newsletter of the Robert Penn Warren Center for the Humanities at Vanderbilt, Nashville, TN), Spring
2009, available at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/rpw_center/Letters/letterss09.pdf.
212. PETER A. LEVINE, WAKING THE TIGER: HEALING TRAUMA 12 (North Atlantic Books, 1st ed. 1997).
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First, to explicate how this interventionist model derives from and enacts
traumatization. Second, to suggest by a kind of counter‑example, that the trauma
resiliency model instigates and provides insights into how we might imagine new
ways of responding to the challenges posed by increasingly complex structures of
injury with which we find ourselves daily confronted.
In order to do this, though, I’ll ask us to move from thinking of identity as an
object and instead to framing it as an activity of identification, that’s a practice
and a mode of cultural performance. I’ll also ask us to notice how these particular
practices come under pressure in various contexts of upheaval and to reflect on
how subjectivization operates in the wake of such events as itself a form of
traumatization.
Traumatization is the concrete and generally material process by which
standard or typical structures that manage everyday disruptions, like suffering,
deprivation, humiliation, physical endangerment, scarcity and so on, how they’re
gradually stressed and brought under unbearable pressure that results in their
seemingly sudden, surprising or traumatic collapse. Thus traumatization is the
slow development of the conditions of possibility out of which the traumatic
event arises. Traumatization is the enabling condition for what we call “trauma.”
Traumatization is also the drawing into or the intersectional coalescing of
diverse and divergent practices, out of which the subject is constituted in fixed
and identifiable ways. This drawing together of familiar practices results in our
having the sense that we know when and where trauma has occurred, to whom
and upon what its rupture has been visited. Who or what is the culpable agent in
its production and why and how it should be addressed or remedied?
Traumatization is the hermeneutic process by which “trauma” in quotes
achieves its being in the worldCits functional and phenomenal meaning.
Traumatization is also the harnessing of a discourse of trauma to a political social
project of a particular type, situated in a particular time, embodiment and social
location. Traumatization is a productive cultural practice that in the form of
claims on truth, on knowability and reliable narrative understanding, accords
213
cultural capital in the service of specifically contextualized political stakes.
It’s also important to note that the temporality of traumatization is elastic and
flowing. It’s a temporality that’s external to itself. It does not originate in some
event before it is named. It is the temporality of seepage, of wasting, of the
imploding political regime and historical epics. Because it is process bound, the
temporality of traumatization has little or nothing to do with time. Its movement
214
and unfolding is systemic and ecological and sometimes genetic. The
temporality of traumatization emerges through the particularities of its
enactment. It’s not already there. Its time comes out of the practice.

213. Id. at 145-55
214. See id. at 8.
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The trauma resiliency model is one set of skills offered as a product by the
215
216
Trauma Resilience Institute. It also offers a Community Resilience Model,
which I’ll call “CRM” going forward, and the Trauma Resiliency Model for
217
Veterans and Warriors, “TRM‑V‑W.” The techniques that together form these
technologies are informed by theoretical models for the treatment of trauma and
post‑traumatic stress disorder in post‑catastrophe context. Their focus is on the
psycho‑physiological effects of trauma and traumatic experiences, evidence and
symptoms to find as consistent with post‑traumatic stress disorder.
For all intents and purposes, TRM, CRM, and TRM‑VW, trauma is PTSD.
The implication has deep ramifications. In biologically oriented scholarship that
informs the TRM, CRM, and TRM‑VW interventional technologies, traumatic
memories are unique in that they are understood as a bundle or a capsule of
network associations and linked processes inscribed at the time of the event, but
also existing outside of time.
The traumatic memory is multi‑dimensional and multi‑scalar in volume,
involving imagery, sensations, perceptions, bodily functions, and processes of
cognitive functions linked with reactions that are contemporaneous with the
event. When one aspect of a traumatic memory is triggered, and this is the
concept that they use about traumatic memory, so, within this concept, when one
aspect of traumatic memory is triggered, it’s said to activate the entire network of
linked reactions, giving it both a sense of immediacy, its present tense, and a
218
timelessness.
This notion of capsule memory also explain why apparently neutral stimuli,
whether internal or external, can trigger extreme responses of fight, flight, or
freeze—and you’re probably familiar with those ‑ and their concomitant
conditioned autonomic effects. When a sufficient number of nodes, or when
nodes with sufficient intensity, have been triggered, the linked images, emotions,
affects, and physiological states all emerge in this collective activation as “the
memory of the event.” It feels like it’s here now, or here/now, whatever you’re
going to make of it.
The Trauma Resource Institute is a non‑profit organization, “committed to
bringing wellness skills and trauma healing based on cutting‑edge neuroscience
219
to the world community one person at a time, one community at a time.” TRI
215. Trauma Resiliency Model, TRAUMA RESOURCE INSTITUTE, http://traumaresourceinstitute.com/
trauma-resiliency-model-trm/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).
216. Community Resiliency Model, TRAUMA RESOURCE INSTITUTE, http://traumaresourceinstitute.com/
community-resiliency-model-crm/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).
217. Trauma Resiliency Model-Veteran & Warrior (TRM-V-W), TRAUMA RESOURCE INSTITUTE,
http://traumaresourceinstitute.com/trauma-resiliency-model-veteran-warrior-trm-v-w/ (last visited Feb. 12,
2015).
218. LEVINE, supra note 212, at 23-27.
219. Elaine Miller Karas, Community Resiliency Model Workbook, TRAUMA RESOURCE INSTITUTE (Sept.
15, 2013), available at http://pacificaidsnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Community-ResiliencyModel-Workbook-Sept.-2013.doc1_.pdf.
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frames its work as being informed by fundamentals about the human condition
that have emerged through the Trauma Resource Institute clinician’s work in the
field. TRI offers three products, as I said—the Trauma Resiliency Model, the
Community Resiliency Model, and the Trauma Resiliency Model, VW.
These are training programs designed to transmit a very specific set of skills
to clinicians and first responders engaging with people who exhibit reactions to
highly stressful situations that are understood to be symptomatic of PTSD. TRI’s
training products focus on bodily experience in what they call “the mind‑body
approach,” focusing on the biological basis of trauma and the automatic
defensive ways that the human body responds when faced with perceived threats
to self and other.
Although the biologically‑based responses that TRM centers are considered
to be classic PTSD symptomology, TRI projects are highly invested in shifting
the discourse from abnormal and pathological response to the normative
biological effects of events that overwhelm the human organism’s capacity for
adequate response. Shifting the discourse in this way allows for traumatic
response to be understood not as weakness or impairment of psychology or
character, but as biological, explainable, and treatable in ways that can be
standardized and commodified.
This also mitigates feelings like shame, humiliation, and self‑blame by
suggesting that these symptoms represent the body’s natural and normal attempt
to stabilize the nervous system, returning it to a level of acceptable equilibrium
for the individual’s resilience zone, and this concept’s super important in TRM
220
CRM, and TRM‑VW. These are biologically grounded, sensation‑based
practices that focus the individual on the possibility of local resiliency.
The practices contained within these models are divided into two distinct
phases: the first is the self‑care phase, and it’s oriented by a core of six
practices—I won’t go into them here—but essentially it trains the trauma
survivor and the first responder in skills aimed at reducing the symptomatic
reactions that emerge in the aftermath of experiencing or witnessing an event
221
that’s life‑threatening or seriously dangerous to yourself or someone else.
The second phase begins to move out from the basic manipulation of the
neuro‑biological processes and toward the metabolizing of traumatic energy
through practices associated with somatic experiencing, and it’s referred to as the
222
trauma‑reprocessing phase. There’s the individual self‑care phase and the
trauma‑reprocessing phase.
A key concept in TRI’s training products is the resilience zone. This is the
base state of neurological equilibrium achievable by all. When in the resilience

220. See generally Trauma Resiliency Model, supra note 215; Trauma Resiliency Model-Veteran &
Warrior (TRM-V-W), supra note 217; Community Resiliency Model, supra note 216.
221. Trauma Resiliency Model, supra note 215.
222. Id.
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zone, the individual is capable of clear thought, complex decision‑making,
emotional control, and possesses a capacity to manage internal bodily stimuli.
According to the TRM technology, when one encounters a threatening event,
one’s physiology prepares for the response of fighting, fleeing, or freezing, and
these are understood as natural responses to threatening situations. In most
instances after the threat has subsided, one’s physiology also returns to a state of
equilibrium. However, and its according to this model, if the threat is substantial
enough or long enough duration, it can shock that system into a state of reaction
223
that does not subside. Thereafter, very small stimuli can cause full‑system
response.
Once it’s been determined that the subject has integrated the self‑care skills,
in phase one, into their activities of daily living in a regular way, the scene is
ready to begin training in trauma reprocessing skills. These practices are derived
most directly from the work of Peter Levine, in what’s been termed somatic
224
experiencing.
According to Levine, the fixed action pattern that occurs at a
time of a traumatic event traps affect in the autonomic nervous system, resulting
225
in things being stuck in a hyper or hypo‑active state of arousal. You might be
depleted and depressed, or you might be over‑stimulated in this model.
The TRI training products all recommend trauma reprocessing as the next
phase of the subject’s mastery of their neuro‑physiological response to triggers,
and each of the skills that they teach deepen the subject’s capacity to bring under
surveillance, control, and appropriate mediation what was previously
ungovernable affect and sensation. All of these skills are practiced with a
certified, TRM‑trained clinician, whose services, or the certification of whom,
can be obtained through the website and some of its products. You go on the
website and you can purchase the services of a TRM‑certified clinician.
The Trauma Resource Institute describes itself as a non‑profit corporation,
globally cultivating trauma‑informed and resiliency informed individuals and
communities by providing education and skills training, that’s how they describe
226
themselves. Over the past three years, TRI has been involved in interventional
practices in China, Rwanda, Kenya, Haiti, and Japan, as well as domestically
within the United States in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and in
the Department of Behavioral Health San Bernardino County, after the fire
storms in southern California. The way they put it, they’re healing modalities to
the international community, that’s part of their mission. Working through
already exit organizational networks, like religious aid, and military
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organizations, TRI is often contacted, or offers its services in the aftermath of
227
natural, or man‑made disasters.
When one reads the field notes, and these field notes are actually available on
the site, so you can go and check them out there. I mean you read these field
notes that describe the organizations’ work in Haiti for example. One notices the
emphasis placed on assessing whether the local actors have absorbed, or
mastered the techniques of the model.
The TRI clinician notes in these notes how well the local first responders
have both integrated the TRM lexicon into their regular practice of speaking, and
how great they look in the TRI t‑shirts that they’ve been given.
...
If they’re reporting back, it’s a success. Interestingly though, much of the
discussion in the field notes and indeed the entire second day of the latter phase
of this three day training, focuses on how the local practitioners can better obtain
funding for TRI, to provide more trainings in more areas. Grant writing and pitch
‑making are the subjects of days two and three of the training event.
TRI’s function of assessing and ascribing value to injury in the development
228
of markets for their product are hand‑in‑hand processes. Indeed one can sense
the impulse to branding and brand control, when in the response, and this is in
the notes there, too.
In response to one group's suggestion that the new trainees might bring TRM
technologies out to these more remote areas in Haiti, or isolated communities, the
TRI representative urges the group to seek grant support to have TRI clinicians
from the United States brought in to do the training. Communities facing disaster
are not the only markets, this is what I’m suggesting, and these are not the only
markets that are being cultivated by TRI.
One can imagine potential collaborations for example, between local
industries, inside industries, and US based producers, of the various products that
TRI offers on the website. For example, on the website they offer props like pens
with built in scrolls, that list the six self‑care skills, or they have these Lance
229
Armstrong bracelets that say “Shift & Stay.”
You can also imagine, the kind of lucrative potential in the introduction of
the iChill app, which is an actual app that you can download to your iPhone or
230
your Android. But you can imagine this being a product that is sold to the kind
of local telephonic marketplace.

227. Global Projects, TRAUMA RESOURCE INSTITUTE, http://traumaresourceinstitute.com/haiti-2/projects/
(last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
228. See Trauma Resource Institute Homepage, TRAUMA RESOURCE INSTITUTE, http://traumaresource
institute.com/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
229. Shop, TRAUMA RESOURCE INSTITUTE, http://traumaresourceinstitute.com/shop/ (last visited Feb. 22,
2015).
230. iChill Download Page, TRAUMA RESOURCE INSTITUTE, http://www.ichillapp.com/ (last visited Feb.
22, 2015).
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The final concern that I’d like to raise has to do with the potential political
effects of an increased, and this is sort of what’s theoretically important to me
also, this sort of increased focus on the biological now. It concerns me that this
focus on the biological now that anchors TRM’s technologies also calls our
attention away from traumatization as a broader process.
Focusing on the biological now can encourage us to satisfy our urge to help,
by evaluating and intervening in the face of another’s suffering, without ever
having to really ask larger questions, and more difficult questions, about how that
suffering comes into being, or how our own intervention, accrues value to that
instance of injury.
That is, these technologies encourage us to focus on the efficacy of
immediate symptom abatement, rather than increasing, sort of increasing
precarity more generally, and to do so in a way that is institutionally acceptable,
and structurally supported, and I’ll end here.
What I’m most interested in elaborating further is the possibility for
developing more complex response systems. Because one thing I do value about
what TRI is doing here, is that they’re calling attention to the different scales at
which these events exist. The biological, the individual, or organ level let’s say,
the individual, the community, the institutional, all at once. I found it to be very
valuable.
What I’d like to be working out, going forward, is what a complex response
system can look like. It takes multi scales, into consideration, and the fact that at
each of those scales is due of a different temporality of experience, so we have
multiple temporality signals.
Yukiko Koga, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, City University of
New York, Hunter College. Between the Law: The Unmaking of Empire and
the Persistence of Redress in Post-Imperial East Asia.
KOGA: My presentation [is] about the temporality of trauma, I’m figuring
out this temporality of trauma intersects with the temporality of law, in the profit
of legally redressing the past injuries in a meaningful manner. The case I’m
looking at is called the compensation lawsuits filed by Chinese war victims
against the Japanese government and corporations, over the past two decades in
various courts across Japan.
For those of you who may not be familiar with the cases, ever since the mid‑
1990s scores of lawsuits have been filed by mostly Chinese and Korean, South
231
Korean war victims, against the Japanese government and corporations. In
Japan there is no class action lawsuit, so many of them take the form of collective
lawsuits. Most of the lawsuits reached the Supreme Court of Japan in the past
two decades, and it’s something I’m trying to go back to and see what’s
happening.

231. William Gao, Overdue Redress: Surveying and Explaining the Shifting Japanese Jurisprudence on
Victims’ Compensation Claims, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529, 533 (2007).
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I wanted to go back to case law, possibly because in 2007 there was a
Japanese Supreme Court ruling, which ruled against the plaintiffs –– the so‑
called “comfort women,” the victims of the wartime sexual slavery and the
232
victims of the wartime use of forced labor. With the 2007 Supreme Court
decision, the overall tone of many commentaries in law review articles and more
public commentaries was that this Supreme Court decision marked the end of the
233
legal redress movement for Chinese war victims.
Many law review articles today reduce the issue to the matter of political
will, basically turning the legal issue into a political issue. I’m questioning that
observation. The paper I wrote is based on a year‑long fieldwork I conducted last
academic year in China, and Japan. I’ve been working with a group of Japanese
lawyers for the past 10 years, who represent Chinese who are victims. Originally,
I joined this legal movement more as a political engagement. I didn’t think about
writing a book about it.
After the Supreme Court ruling I started to realize that there is something
else going on that hasn’t been really analyzed, or written up. It is my first attempt
to figure out what it was that I kept feeling very uncomfortable, while I work in
one of the lawyer’s law offices during that year, and going through thousands of
legal documents while participating in victims’ organization activities in China,
in rural parts of China that I never explored before, even though I did field work
in other parts of China.
This paper presents my preliminary findings. I hope it will bring out some
interesting discussions about the law, and the place of law within the legal action,
the redress for past violence. I will not go into my ethnography due to the time
constraint today, because most of what I’ve written is very ethnographic. As an
anthropologist, I think the summarized ethnography is not really ethnography,
Ethnography is all about the details.
For the purpose of the presentation I will focus on what the law was doing in
the course of the 20 years of lawsuits. It might sound like a funny question for us,
when I’m dealing with a bigger case, and I think about the place of law, or the
role of the law. My presentation hopefully will make it clear that the place and
the role of law becomes more and more obscure, and vague, and then eventually
disappear.
What I’m going to do is to briefly introduce what this course of legal action
revealed to the public eye. Then we’ll go through three major legal doctrines

232. Judicial Proceedings: Comfort Women, G. W. U., http://www.gwu.edu/~memory/data/judicial/
comfortwomen.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
233. Saikō Sanbansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 27, 2007, Heisei 16 (ju) No. 1658 (forced labor case) and Saikō
Sanbansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 27, 2007, Heisei 17 (ju) No. 1735 (comfort women case). On the basis of these
rulings, the Supreme Court of Japan dismissed the appeals of other cases on the same day (Saikō Sanbansho
[Sup. Ct.] Apr. 27, 2007, Heisei 17 [o] No. 985 [comfort women case]; Saikō Sanbansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 27,
2007, Heisei 14 [ne] No. 511; and Saikō Sanbansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 27, 2007, Heisei 8 [wa] No. 5435 [forced
labor case]). For an example of how scholars view the cases, see Gao, supra note 231.
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deployed throughout the course of the lawsuit to see what’s being buried beneath
these legal doctrines, which might point to something more fundamental to the
issue. I want to focus on what the legal cases revealed that were quite dramatic.
Except for a television series like “Law and Order,” very often legal cases are not
that dramatic, and most of the time you just go through procedures.
In the forced labor case there was a political drama, which revealed that the
Japanese government committed secondary violence even after the war ended
and the official end of the wartime forced labor. What happened was that during
the course of the lawsuit, the Japanese lawyers representing the Chinese case
discovered secret archives, which were supposed to be destroyed, or supposed to
234
be hidden. More than 2,000 pages of these Japanese government archives detail
235
the wartime use of forced labor and the post‑war cover‑up. That was
dramatically displayed during the lawsuit and there was a huge public drama
exploring this hidden archive.
What these archives revealed was not only the work and use of the forced
labor but also how, immediately after the Japanese defeat in the Second World
War in 1945, the Japanese corporations that enslaved Chinese forced labor
received compensation from the Japanese government for “the loss of Chinese
laborers” at the end of the war. I did not make a mistake in formulating this
sentence. [laughs] It was the Japanese corporations which enslaved Chinese
laborers during the war that received huge amounts of compensation money from
the Japanese government, while the Chinese survivors were sent back to a civil
236
war‑torn China without a single penny paid to them.
This compensation which defied our common‑sense understanding of
compensation— which I would call the “inverted compensation”—was revealed
during the course of the lawsuit. In addition to this revelation that detailed these
closed Japanese archives demonstrates how in post‑war years in the 1950s and
1960s until the early 1970s the Japanese government really tried hard to hide
237
their wartime use of Chinese laborers.
Through this inverted compensation, this lawsuit revealed the unfinished
project of the unmaking of the Japanese Empire within the economic sphere. It’s
hard to tell the impact of this compensation money for the recovery of the
Japanese corporations in postwar years, but it was a significant amount. It would
be hard to imagine how these corporations jump‑started after the end of the war
without this kind of bailout money from the government.
That was the major dramaCthe lawsuit revealed the unfinished project in the
economic sphere, end of the story, many people thought. At the political level,
234. Gao, supra note 231, at 540-41.
235. Yukiko Koga, Accounting for Silence: Inheritance, Debt, and the Moral Economy of Legal Redress in
China and Japan, 40 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 494, 498 (2013), available at http://www.hunter.cuny.edu/anthropology/
faculty-staff/full-time-faculty/koga-yukiko/repository/files/Koga%202013%20Accounting%20for%20Silence.pdf.
236. Id. at 498.
237. Id.
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there was no compensation for the victims, so the blame goes to the political
maneuvering of the legal sphere and that lack of political will, which was
238
translated into the inability for the law to address the compensation issue.
As I was going through these legal documents, I started to notice something
else might be going on, and that’s the law’s complicity in this project, which can
be described as the economic form of unmaking of the Japanese Empire. I started
reading through the legal documents and there were three legal doctrines
deployed over the 20 years of lawsuits, which in the end resulted in an almost
seemingly perpetual deferral of justice within the legal sphere.
Let me move onto what’s going on in the deployment of these three legal
doctrines. In all these lawsuits, most of the lawsuits didn’t win from the lower
239
court to higher court. The three doctrines were deployed in succession.
The first doctrine that was deployed was the statute of limitations. Since the
original injury officially ended in 1945 when the Japanese Empire disappeared
with the Japanese defeat in the Second World War, the court ruled that by the
time the lawsuits took place in the mid‑1990s, it was too late. Statute of
limitations is 20 years in Japan in a civil case. The original inquiry ended in 1945
and it’s 1995 or 1998 and it’s too late. That was how it was ruled out initially.
240
Although, that was later overcome on the principle of justice and fairness.
Once the statute of limitations doctrine got over by the lawyers representing
the victims, the second doctrine that was deployed by the court was the sovereign
immunity doctrine. Sovereign immunity was a legal doctrine practiced under the
Meiji Imperial Constitution, which was the constitution before 1945. After the
Japanese defeat in the war, the Japanese government adapted a completely new
constitution, the so‑called peace constitution, in 1946. During the wartime, it was
241
under the Imperial constitution, which had sovereign immunity .
The court ruled that because the original incident took place before the
enactment of the new Japanese post‑war constitution they deployed the
sovereign immunity principle—to say, well, the Japanese government is not
242
responsible for the state actions. That’s an interesting apparition of how legal
framework from the past suddenly appears in front of the Chinese plaintiffs, who
thought they were standing before the contemporary Japanese law.
I don’t have the time to go into the details, but it was an incredibly difficult
process for these victims to stand in front of the Japanese judges. Most of these
victims are from rural China, where they don’t have any running water or
electricity or anything. Not even, sometimes, a regular postal service. They are so
isolated that until the Japanese lawyers started to contact them, they didn’t have

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
Gao, supra note 231, at 538.
Id .at 539-40.
Koga, supra note 235, at 496.
Id. at 499.

139

2015 / Symposium on Injury as Cultural Practice
any communication with the other victims. They didn’t have any means to go to
Japan.
For them, it was such a big fear to stand before the Japanese law. What they
didn’t realize was they weren’t really standing before the Japanese law. They
were—according to the court—standing before the not‑existing pre‑war Imperial
constitution. They were caught in this strange temporal gap between the present
legal system and the disappeared past legal system. They were in a sense
standing not before the law but standing between the law, despite the fact that
they thought they were standing before the Japanese law.
The sovereign immunity principle later was again overturned by the lawyers
243
representing Chinese victims. It just turned out after a very detailed historical
research they did that the lawyers discovered that the sovereign immunity
principle didn’t have any codified legal foundation even under the Imperial Meiji
Constitution.
The Japanese legal system is different from the US legal system, it’s similar
to the European continental legal system, and we need the codified law to make a
case. It turned out that there was nowhere that they can find a codification of
sovereign immunity. Even during the prewar era, it was just a practice that
conjured up this image of principle.
Eventually the court also overturned the use of sovereign immunity. The
lawyers representing the victims were getting upbeat. They broke the legal
barrier of the statute of limitations, and they broke the barrier of sovereign
immunity—two legal doctrines that they thought were written in stone and they
couldn’t break.
Then, in the Supreme Court case, the court deployed a third legal doctrine,
which was that China renounced reparation claims in the 1972 communiqué
between China and Japan, which established diplomatic relations between the
PRC and Japan. The court argued the Chinese individuals don’t have the legal
right to seek compensation for their injury because in the Communiqué the
244
Chinese government renounced its reparation claims.
This was the very last legal frontier or legal doctrine that the court deployed
to put the Chinese plaintiffs not before the law. Even though it seemed that they
were standing before the law, but actually between the laws. This between space
that is a kind of legal lacuna.
It appears that they are standing before the law, but in reality they are in this
space, zone of exceptional space where the law doesn’t exist. Law keeps
presenting itself absent in front of them, and that legal lacuna is what I’m calling
between the law as opposed to before the law.

243. See, e.g., Ni’igata Chihō Saibansho [Niigata Dist. Ct.] Mar. 14, 2007, Heisei 11 [wa] No. 543,
Ni’igata Chihō Saibansho [Niigata Dist. Ct.] Mar. 14, 2007, Heisei 12 [wa] No. 489, and Ni’igata Chihō
Saibansho [Niigata Dist. Ct.] Mar. 14, 2007, Heisei 14 [wa] No. 139.
244. Saikō Sanbansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 27, 2007, Heisei 16 (ju) No. 1658.
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I kept wondering what this legal lacuna means and it seems inappropriate to
reduce this legal lacuna to only the lack of political will. There must be
something going on. I smell something fishy about this . . . perpetual absenting of
law within the legal action.
I decided to go back to the foundational laws that defined Japan’s post‑war
beginning. As I mentioned earlier in my presentation, the Japanese government
adapted a completely new constitution, the so‑called peace constitution, in 1946,
and this constitution was drafted by the U.S. occupation. It was embraced as this
peace‑loving, incredibly progressive constitution which renounces any use of
245
military as diplomatic means. When I went back to this constitution, which I
read as a student with such affection and passion, I realized that there was
something fundamental that’s missing in this constitution.
Which was that, if it was written for the Japanese and when the Empire
expired, yes, on paper the Empire expired, but what happens to the Empire’s
remains? What happens to the formal colonial subjects, who had no choice but to
become colonial subjects?
Or the people who were part of the Japanese Empire and all of a sudden
became something else. It just struck me all of a sudden how the Japanese
constitution had nothing to say about the Empire’s remains or what it means to de
‑imperialize the Japanese Empire within the legal sphere.
It doesn’t address anything legally about what it means to de‑imperialize. It
was written instead as a post‑war constitution. That post‑warness instead of post
‑imperialness became even more clear in another pillar of the post‑war legal
reform in Japan, which is the State Redress Act. State Redress Act was the very
explicit legal code to negate the sovereign immunity principle, by saying the
246
Japanese state is responsible for state actions in a legal manner. That’s a very
strong negation of the pre‑war imperial legal system.
What’s notable is one of the clauses within this State Redress Act says,
[essentially] “This law does not apply to foreign citizens unless the foreign
government offers reciprocal kind of legal framework,” which ruled out China
and Korea—Chinese and Korean citizens as benefiting from this new State
247
Redress Act. In a way, it closes off any legal actions from the former colonial
and imperial subjects through this newly in place State Redress Act, which is a
redeclaration, explicitly, of what’s not written in the constitution law.
What I started to notice was how in the language of the law there was a
deliberate way of not dealing with post‑imperial aspects. That’s the law’s
complicity in not dealing with the huge projects of unmaking of the Japanese
Empire that I started to see through these legal cases.

245. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 9 (Japan).
246. Kokka Baishō Hō [State Redress Act], Law No. 125 of 1947 (Japan).
247. See Koga, supra note 235, at 499.
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That aspect might be changing, however. I just want to—since I’m running
out of time—just give you the very recent development that may really reshape
this erasure of post‑imperial process in the legal sphere.
In 2011, the South Korean Constitutional Court made a very significant
decision, which claimed that it is unconstitutional for the South Korean
government not to allow their citizens to seek legal redress for the wartime
248
injuries. Similar to Chinese government, South Korean government renounced
reparation claims when they signed a treaty in 1965 to establish diplomatic
relations with Japanese government.
Japanese government in 1965 actually offered some kind of compensation
money to the so‑called “comfort women.” But the South Korean government,
according to recently declassified South Korean government archives, actually
refused to receive this compensation money that the Japanese government
offered, and instead they sought economic assistance and economic investment
249
from Japan.
In 1965 South Korea was not democratic, so nobody wanted to invest,
similar to China in the early ‘70s when it was still going through the Cultural
Revolution. No European country wanted to invest in such a turbulent, unstable
state.
The Chinese government also renounced reparation claims, but instead they
received a huge amount of development assistance from Japan. It was a very
complicated process, more than just a lack of political will. But in 2011, this
South Korean Constitutional Court overturned that political trend by saying
[essentially], “It’s unconstitutional if we don’t let our citizens seek legal redress.”
After that decision, scores of competition lawsuits were filed within South
250
Korean courts by South Korean victims of wartime use of forced labor.
This new development in South Korea is spurring renewed interest among
Chinese victims, lawyers and activists in China. Just this past week on February
26, a group of Chinese forced labor victims filed lawsuits against the Japanese
251
corporations in the Beijing Regional Court. They haven’t accepted their filings.

248. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Da22549, May 24, 2012 (S. Kor.).
249. Treaty on Basic Relations, Japan-S. Kor, Jun. 22, 1965, 583 U.N.T.S. 8471.
250. See the South Korean Constitutional Court decision, “Challenge against Act of Omission Involving
Article 3 of the ‘Agreement on the Settlement of Problem concerning Property and Claims and the Economic
Cooperation between the Republic of Korea and Japan’” , Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2006 Hun-Ma788,
August 30, 2011 (23-2[A] KCCR 366) (S. Kor.), which recognized the individual rights to claim compensation
in the so-called comfort women cases. For an English translation of the decision, see http://english.ccourt.go.kr/.
The landmark decision by the Supreme Court of Korean on May 24, 2012 echoed the 2011 South Korean
Constitutional Court decision in recognizing the individual rights to claim compensation from Japan.
Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2009Da22549, May 24, 2012 (S. Kor.).
251. Update 1-Chinese Wartime Forced Laborers Sue Japanese Corporation, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2014,
2:53 PM IST), http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/02/26/china-japan-lawsuit-idINL3N0LV2H520140226 (the
court has since accepted the case).
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In the past, five cases were attempted to be filed in Chinese courts, but all of
them were not accepted by these Chinese courts.
This time the Chinese foreign minister had expressed a very positive remark
for this new development. It’s very likely, but even in a couple of weeks, we
might hear news about this Beijing Regional Court accepting the lawsuits from
the forced labor survivors and their family members.
If that happens that will really open up a new legal frontier, which will really
question this post 1945 legal framework based on the cold war; that is, postwar
legal framework as opposed to the post‑imperial, post‑colonial legal framework.
There is something interesting to monitor in the next several weeks. Let me finish
here . . . Thank you.
Khiara M. Bridges, Associate Professor of Law and Associate Professor
of Anthropology, Boston University “When Pregnancy is an Injury: Rape,
Law, and Culture.
BRIDGES: . . .
I teach in the law school at Boston University. When I got the job, they said,
“You, you can have the job, but you have to teach criminal law.” That was a
shock to me, because I hadn’t thought about criminal law since I was in law
school. I was like, “Fine I’ll do it.” I decided to use the same casebook that I used
when I was in law school. . . .
Eventually we got to this unit on sexual assault. The book had reproduced a
variety of states’ sexual assault statutes in order to sort of show the varying ways
that states take with defining what rape is. I got to the Wisconsin sexual assault
statute. There in the book the statute defined first degree sexual assault as,
“[S]exual contact or sexual intercourse with another person without consent of
252
that person [which] causes pregnancy or great bodily harm to that person.”
When I read it, the light started to shut off and then it came back on. A door
flew open. An angel descended from heaven . . . I was so incredibly fascinated by
the way that the statute equated pregnancy and substantial bodily harm or great
bodily harm as equivalent.
Let me just back up a bit. States do take varying approaches to defining
sexual assault. Usually, it’s some sort of combination of facts, force, and non‑
consent. Once states have defined sexual assault, some states, a lot of states,
divide sexual assault into categories that impose different sentences, based on the
presence or absence of aggravating factors.
You might have a first degree rape in which there’s non‑consensual forced
sex, in which an aggravating factor is present. You might have a second degree
rape in which there’s force, non‑consent, and there’s no aggravating factor. They
might even have a third degree rape, where there’s no force, it’s just non‑

252. WIS. STAT. § 940.225(1)(a) (2012) (defining first-degree sexual assault as “sexual contact or sexual
intercourse with another person without consent of that person” that “causes pregnancy or great bodily harm to
that person”).
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consensual sex, et cetera. The infliction of a substantial bodily injury, or a great
bodily harm, or a serious personal injury, or similar during the course of a rape, is
an aggravating factor that can elevate a rape to a more seriously graded offense.
The question then becomes, “What is a substantial bodily injury?” Most
states follow the model penal code formulation of substantial bodily injury or
great bodily harm. Model penal codes define serious bodily injury as, “[b]odily
injury, which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious
permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss, or impairment of the function of any
253
bodily member or organ.” Accordingly, it’s not intuitive at all that pregnancy
should be understood as a substantial bodily injury or its equivalent. As a result
you have states like Wisconsin, who’s specifically providing that pregnancy
should be treated the same as substantial bodily injury. You have Michigan and
254
Nebraska, specifically providing that pregnancy is a serious personal injury.
You see courts in a lot of jurisdictions, including California, as well as the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits and others, allowing juries to consider on a case‑by‑
case basis, whether a victim’s pregnancy should be understood as a substantial
255
bodily injury in that case.
Why should we care? First reason, it’s fascinating, but three other reasons.
We should care, because this construction of pregnancy as an injury runs directly
counter to positive constructions of pregnancy within culture.
What do I mean by positive constructions of pregnancy? In the original
256
reiteration of the paper, I caught a hegemonic. It’s a very powerful idea of
pregnancy that is disseminated, and reiterated, and justified by various
institutions, including religion, politics, etcetera. This idea, this positive
construction of pregnancy says that pregnancy is inherently . . . is beautiful, it’s
life affirming. It’s always going to be a positive event in the life of a woman.
Which is not to say that this positive construction of pregnancy cannot
understand or disavow that pregnancy is frequently burdensome, it’s painful, it’s
physically testing.
According to the positive construction of pregnancy, these negative aspects
about pregnancy are overshadowed or overcome by the beautiful aspects of
pregnancy. The negative aspects make the experience bittersweet, but it is always
and in every case more sweet than bitter. The fact that the criminal law rejects the
positive notion of pregnancy in its entirety and says, “No pregnancy is an injury,”
creates a possibility that this negative construction of pregnancy may be received

253. MODEL PENAL CODE § 120.0(3) (1981).
254. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520a(n) (2012); NEB.REV. STAT. § 28-318(4) (2012).
255. See, e.g., People v. Cross, 190 P.3d 706, 717 (Cal. 2008) (Corrigan, J., concurring) (“Factors such as
the age of the victim, as well as the outcome, duration, or problems associated with a pregnancy may make its
impact even more substantial”); United States v. Guy, 340 F.3d 655, 658 (8th Cir. 2003) (emphasizing
individual circumstances of the case).
256. Khiara M. Bridges, When Pregnancy is an Injury: Rape, Law, and Culture, 65 STAN. L. REV. 457,
461 (2013).
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within culture as a construction of pregnancy that is as legitimate as a positive
construction. It’s counter hegemonic. These laws create the possibility for the re‑
257
imagining of pregnancy within other areas of the law in society more generally.
The second reason why we should care, or perhaps the third one is, the first
reason was that it’s fascinating. The third reason we should care is because it’s
significant that the historically male institution that is the law reflects an
experience of the body that is profoundly female . . .
Fourth, we should care because of recent arguments that antiabortionist
activists have been making. Reva Siegel at Yale Law has pretty much dedicated
her life’s work to documenting the extension of what she calls “Woman‑
258
Protective Antiabortion Argumentation,” or WPAA.
Woman‑protective anti‑abortion argumentation is essentially arguments that
restrictions on abortion rights—that we ought to have restrictions on abortion
rights in order to protect women from harming themselves. We have to protect
women by restricting their ability to get an abortion. Why? Because abortion
harms women.
The story that she tells is one in which opponents of abortion used to argue
against abortion rights by focusing on the effects that abortion had on the fetus.
According to the former line of argument, abortion should be made illegal
because it kills fetuses. It injures fetuses. However, the fetal focused argument
didn’t win anti‑abortion activists the result that they wanted, which was the
sympathy of the majority of Americans as well as the overturning of Roe v.
Wade.
In response, activists adopted their advocacy in light of the criticism that anti
‑abortion activists cared too much about fetuses and too little about women.
They redirected their advocacy and they said, “No, no, no. We, too, just like the
pro‑choice people, we too care about women.” According to the new strategy,
abortion should be limited not only because it harms fetuses, but also because it
259
harms women.
The movement has been arguing that abortion is harmful because it leads to
post‑abortion syndrome, mental health problems, depression, trauma, increased
post‑traumatic stress disorder specifically, increased risk of breast cancer, as
Lochlann told us yesterday. When you prevent women from being pregnant or
from carrying pregnancy to term, you’re allowing for the buildup of hormones
that ultimately will cause breast cancer and ovarian cancer.
Anti‑abortion activists have been saying, “No, we need to protect women
from getting these abortions that harm them, because they lead to all of these

257. Id. at 458.
258. See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L. J. 1694, 1706-35 (2008) (examining the history of the woman -protective
antiabortion argumentation).
259. Id. at 1713-16.
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260

horrible conditions of the body.” Restricting abortion protects women from
these ills, but most importantly, woman‑protective anti‑abortion argumentation
has made it into jurisprudence, which is perhaps the scariest part of this for those
who are interested in abortion rights.
In 2003, the court decided Gonzales v. Carhart, which is called “Carhart 2,”
261
because there is a “Carhart 1,” which was a much better decision. . . .
In Carhart 2 in 2003, the court upheld the federal Partial‑Birth Abortion Ban
Act, which prohibited certain methods of performing second and third trimester
abortions. It is a very gruesome procedure, but there are reasons for the
procedure. But nevertheless, Congress banned it. It said doctors can’t do it
anymore. The Supreme Court upheld the ban.
In upholding the ban, the majority opinion, which was written by Justice
Kennedy. Kennedy went above and beyond the call of duty in that opinion, as he
so frequently does, but he said that, “[i]t is unexceptionable”—and I’m quoting—
“it [is] unexceptionable to conclude that some women come to regret their choice
262
to abort the infant life [that] they once created and sustained.” Furthermore, he
cited an activist named Sandra Cano, who has made it her life’s work to
document women basically saying that their lives were destroyed by their
abortions. He cited her amicus brief, which provided 96 pages of excerpts
263
testifying that abortion in practice hurts women’s health.
. . . I want to show how Mary Ann’s framework for injury inequality can be
used to understand what anti‑abortion activists have done here. Prior to their
woman‑protective anti‑abortion argumentation, when they were focusing on
harm to the fetus, they were basically saying that, “Yes, abortion should be made
illegal. Yes, there’s an injury to women when they are forced to bear pregnancies
that they don’t want to bear, but the injury to the fetus ought to trump that injury
to the woman.”
What they’ve done now with woman‑protective anti‑abortion argumentation
is to change the calculus altogether. Now they’re saying, “OK. Let’s make
abortion illegal, because yes, women who have to bear pregnancies, they’re
injured perhaps by having to bear a pregnancy, but that injury is going to be
outweighed by both the harm to the fetus as well as the harm to the woman
should she get post‑traumatic stress disorder.” It’s a Jiu jitsu, if you will. They’re
using arguments that, pro‑choice arguments against pro‑choice activists.
In light of the court’s acceptance of woman‑protective anti‑abortion
argumentation, it is safe to assume that we’ll see more of it. In fact, protecting
women has provided the justification for the wave of abortion restrictions that
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burden abortion access through the informed consent process.
restrictions are as ubiquitous as they are conservative.
The relationship between woman‑protective anti‑abortion argumentation
265
and these criminal statutes that treat pregnancy as an injury is one of challenge.
The question that we have to ask, is it fair to say that abortion is harming women
when unwanted pregnancy itself is a literal injury to women? Is it fair to say that
women are being harmed by the modality that is curing them of an injury, if
pregnancy is an injury?
If abortion does harm women, then on what principle can we compel women
to remain injured—that is, unwantedly pregnant—in order to protect them from a
harm, which abortion may be. Women are faced with two evils. An injury that is
pregnancy and a harm that is abortion, on what principle should be denied the
right to decide which of the two evils they will endure? These sexual assault
statutes counsel a retrieval of abortion rights advocacy that has fallen out of use
and from some, but not every, memory.
Abortion rights activists used to argue that we ought to protect abortion
266
rights because unwanted pregnancies are injuries to women. Indeed, providing
phenomenological accounts of pregnancy as injury was the precise legal strategy
of the National Abortion Rights Action League, NARAL, in Thornburgh v. the
267
ACOG, which the court reaffirmed Roe v. Wade in that case.
In an amicus brief, NARAL attempted to demonstrate the fundamentality of
the abortion right, not by looking to constitutional text or history, but rather by
268
looking to women’s experiences of their pregnant bodies as injured. The brief
quoted letters of women who described what it felt like to bear an unwanted
pregnancy. Women described themselves as terrified. Just as you’re terrified if
269
you have been injured.
. . . In light of the spread of woman‑protective antiabortion argumentation,
abortion rights advocates might need to focus on this phenomenological
experience of pregnancy as an injury. . . .
We have to acknowledge that these rape statutes that treat pregnancy as a
great bodily injury or substantial bodily injury, they could reflect two competing
270
formulations of when pregnancy is an injury. In one formulation, pregnancy is
271
an injury whenever it is the result of non‑consensual sex. Essentially, rape
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1985 WL 669630.
269. Id. at 29.
270. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318.
271. WIS. STAT. § 940.19 & § 940.225.
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makes pregnancy an injury. In another formulation, pregnancy is an injury
whenever it is unwanted. The non‑consensual nature of the sex is irrelevant.
Whenever a woman experiences her pregnancy as unwanted, that’s what makes it
272
ontologically a physical injury.
I favor the latter formulation because it accurately describes the one in which
pregnancy is an injury whenever it is unwanted, not only when it is the result of
non‑consensual sex. I favor that formulation because it accurately describes how
women experience unwanted pregnancy. I think it’s the profound unwanted-ness
of the pregnancy that results from rape that makes it an injury.
A woman carrying an unwanted pregnancy, whether it is due to rape or not,
273
tends to experience it as a harm that is happening to her body. It is the
274
wantedness that determines the phenomenology of the pregnancy. It should be
the wantedness that dictates the ontological status of pregnancy. Which reminds
me of Anne and Marc’s paper from yesterday. Perhaps wantedness makes
pregnancy something like an enhancement. It’s the unwantedness of the
pregnancy that makes pregnancy something like an injury.
It’s the same state of the body, but it’s the desire for it. If I break my nose, I
don’t want it to be broken. It’s definitely an injury. But if I break my nose
pursuant to a nose job—not an injury. It’s an enhancement. I think it’s wanted in
the latter case. That’s what determines the ontological status of the pregnancy.
However, I have to contend with the alternative formulation that pregnancies are
injuries only when it is the result of non‑consensual sex. Unwantedness is
irrelevant. Consent to sex dictates whether a pregnancy is an injury, according to
275
this alternative formulation.
It’s true that in other areas of the law the absence or presence of consent
transforms phenomena into legal injury. The absence of consent transforms
phenomena into legal injury. When I consent to being punched by another in a
boxing match—no legal injury. In the absence of my consent to get hit—assault,
I’m calling the police.
If I consent to have someone in my house because I’m having a dinner
party—no legal injury. Absence of consent—you’re trespassing. If I consent to
have someone paint a beautiful mural on my wall in my backyard—no legal
injury. Absence of consent—defacement of property. When consent is absent, a
legal injury results in a lot of cases.
With respect to pregnancy, it’s tempting to phrase the question as whether
consenting to sex that results in pregnancy is tantamount to consenting to the
pregnancy, such that a woman cannot assert that the resulting pregnancy is a
legal injury. However, the claim in this paper is much broader than that. I’m not
272. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520.
273. Brief of Petitioner at 12, Thornburgh v American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747 (1985) (Nos 84-495 and 84-1379), 1985 WL 669630.
274. Id. at 21.
275. People v. Cross, 45 Cal.4th 58, 66 (2008).
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claiming that the criminal law statutes recognize that pregnancy without consent
is a legal injury. I’m saying that these statutes recognize that pregnancy without
276
consent is a literal injury. It’s an injury to the body.
The question when properly formulated has to be something along the lines
of whether consenting to the sex that results in pregnancy is tantamount to
consenting to the pregnancy such that a woman cannot assert that the resulting
pregnancy is a literal, physical injury to her body. I’d say no. The answer has to
be no. Consenting to sex, a woman only consents to the risk of becoming
pregnant, not to the actual pregnancy itself. I’ll say that again. A woman has only
consented to exposing herself to the risk of becoming pregnant by consenting to
sex. She hasn’t consented to the pregnancy itself.
This is relevant because in many other contexts, we don’t lose the claim of
having been injured by unwanted things that happen to us, even when we have
exposed ourselves to the risk that those things will indeed happen to us. If I say,
“Guys, let’s go bungee jumping. Let’s do it. Let’s run outside.” “It’s going to be
awesome. It’s going to be amazing.” I’m consenting to exposing myself to the
risk of dying, but also being injured should something happen.
If something should happen, if my bungee cord snaps, no one’s going to say
to me, “The concussion that you have, those broken legs, the black eyes, those
aren’t actual injuries to you, because you consented to expose yourself to the risk
that those things will happen to you.”
The same thing happens in the context of pregnancy. When a woman has
exposed herself to the risk that she’ll become pregnant by consenting to having
sex with a man, should the risk materialize and should she become pregnant, she
may justifiably identify her unwanted pregnancy as an injury although she
consented to exposing herself to the risk that she would be injured. . . .
RAQUEL ALDANA, DISCUSSANT
. . . I want to begin first with the theme of in‑between law that you raised,
Ms. Koga. I won’t repeat a lot of what you explained, but one of the things that
you were talking about was lost complicity and in placing the Chinese victims in
‑between the law when they went before the Japanese tribunals. . . . I want to
suggest that part of what is going on has to do with Japan being a former empire
and even in the post‑empire years still holding on to the vision of empire, both
for itself as an identity, but also the way other nations identify Japan.
. . . I was just thinking about this as a way of thinking about how also the
culture of empire both as an identity as a nation and also the way nations are
perceived as developing nations, poor nations, versus nations with economic
power, at least in the way that perhaps Japan and China, in their particular
periods of time, may have defined this absence of the foreign or the international
law in that context.
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That’s one issue. Another theme that you didn’t speak about as much, but I
was struck about . . . is the theme of economy and law. Just by way of explaining,
you talk in that paper about China’s complicity in deciding to settle and in some
ways betray the victims by deciding to tell Japan, “Listen. You don’t have to pay
us reparations.”
In many ways, this was an attempt on behalf of the Chinese at the time to
capitalize on the economic bilateral relations with Japan. It was also at a time
when Japan was at an economic advantage, at a more powerful time, economic
time. It resulted in money that flew from Japan in the form of aid to China. I also
found it fascinating how subsequently in this history that you tell us, Japan, when
it became less of an economic power and had a lot of incentive to play nice to
China, started to settle out this case, despite the fact that these cases had been
unsuccessful in Japanese courts, and settled out of their own, decided to pay
some of the reparations in settlements. . . .
Now, I want to move away from those broader themes to the theme that
Professor Bridges talked about in a very different context . . . As I was reading
your article, and thinking about pregnancies injury, the very first thing that came
to my mind . . . the fact that no one ever has talked about pregnancy as injury.
I’m thinking, if there were mass rapes, there must have been pregnancies all over
the place that were the direct result of this brutality and it’s so invisible.
. . . As an enhanced, in the same way that it’s being discussed in the rape
situation here in the U.S., whether rape as an injury even plays a role, especially
when in the most obvious cases, where it’s being used as a war weapon, where it
would perhaps seem less controversial to suggest the idea that rape should be
treated as injury.
Having said that, one of the reasons that I don’t think that it may happen is
because of the implications on the remedy, which is, if you treat it as an injury,
277
then what’s the remedy, and of course abortion comes up. I think that the clash
of cultures . . . I think that if we try to bring the idea of pregnancy as injury
beyond the U.S. to a global setting, in particular in the context of contested law,
like human rights, I don’t see how it would win because of the implications on
the remedy as abortion.
. . . The final thing that I want to say is to tie the paper a little bit to our
Professor Stevens’ work on trauma and the implications that involve reparations.
One of the themes that Professor Koga didn’t get to talk about is in her paper, she
describes beautifully the process of victimization and the silence that followed.

277. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520a(n); NEB.REV. STAT. § 28-318(4) (2012); Cross, 45 Cal.4th at
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every pregnancy resulting from unlawful sexual conduct, forcible or otherwise, will invariably support a factual
determination that the victim has suffered a significant injury within the meaning of the statute at issue. Instead,
the court concluded based on the facts of the specific case.
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Both self‑imposed, but also imposed on the victimization of the Chinese. You
describe how, in some instances, some of the victims haven’t spoken about it at
all, even to their own children as a choice, in order to rescue them from the
trauma that they had experienced.
Certainly, I think that the natural tendency in situations as traumatic as
crimes against humanity is silence as a response. It’s also very natural,
sometimes self‑imposed as a self‑censor mechanism, but sometimes through
law, like amnesty for example, and also, through the rhetoric of forgiveness. It’s
better to forgive than to hold onto that pain. I was thinking about that and then I
was thinking about how the type of intervention that you’re talking about, that is
immediate intervention, doesn’t happen. It just doesn’t happen with respect to a
lot of these victims. Or, it doesn’t happen right away.
. . . It made me think about the disconnect between legal processes and the
psychology of trauma and how careful we need to be. . . . We have to balance on
the one hand the need for collective reparations and breaking the silence, and on
the other hand, the psychology of trauma and learn more about how to deal with
that in the context of atrocity and trauma. That’s all. Thank you. . . .
Professor Michael McCann, Rapporteur: The Rapportuer is going to rap
to wrap things up . . . Yesterday, we mostly talked about individual injury and
individual experience . . . A lot of focus on [the] construction of the rights
bearing, self or rights bearing subject. [There was also] some attention to
collective experience, collective injury, and collective experience with the injury
yesterday. . . . That was much more front and centered today.
I think that the collective injury, collective experience, and collective action
around injury is an important issue that’s different in some ways than [the issues
raised by] individuals . . . You have the related issues . . . which both individuals
and collective injuries raise, about gender, about race, about class, about larger
questions that go to inequality. . .
. . . . Then there’s the temporal dimension . . . we were introduced to the
temporal dimension dealing with past horrors and injuries. Yesterday, with
Johnson’s piece, it came up a few times. But it’s much more front and centered
today.
I want to talk about a couple of the papers—expand on those themes just a
little bit. First of all, if you go to [Maurice] Stevens’ paper . . . What I was most
intrigued about the paper was almost a sort of, not an afterthought, but a
secondary or tertiary issue in the presentation itself. . . . It’s the kind of medically
licensed individualized way of dealing with trauma. It’s a way of dealing . . .
[that can be] . . . an evasion of dealing with the larger sources of what the injuries
were and the political responses and [also] thinking about how it might redefine
the community.
. . . I would want to suggest that that’s a big part of what we should look for
and think about and analyze in responses to mass injuries, catastrophes and so
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forth. One kind of example . . . [is] mourning after mass injuries . . . If you’ve
ever been to . . . you can actually go to the Tenement Museum and see what the
conditions of garment production was like in Manhattan. I urge you to go if
you’re close by.
The thing now—a fire broke out, a couple hundred people died. It was very
tragic . . . men and women, but they were mostly Italian and Jewish. What
happened as a result of that was a moment that exposed precisely the issues about
279
exploit working conditions, unsafe working conditions, and regulation.
. . . That led to a kind of national reconsideration about the conditions of
these workers. That led to . . . [looking] at the workplace conditions, the issuing
of regulations, raising wages of the workers, and also a broader change in the
racial constellation of America. Italians and Jews who had been largely excluded
as non‑white or not part of the WASP sort of majority, now we’re included in the
dominant society near white they were accepted as white . . .
The tragedy is a moment of reconsideration and reconstruction. Although at
the same time that it expanded to immigrant groups as a sort of white status, part
of the community of rights bearing individuals, not fully, but a big step
forward . . .
. . . . Mass injury can be an opportunity for reconstruction. It can also be a
moment for evasion. That really connects very much [with] Yukiko Koga’s
argument. . . . 9 -11 . . . could have been a moment for another reconsideration.
We could have reconsidered a . . . policy in what we were doing around the
world that had something to do with the roots of terrorism and why so many
people hate us and want to wreak violence on the nation and killed these people.
It could have been a moment to reconsider the difference between individual
innocent people who died in the Towers and collective non‑innocence—that
responsibility that we bear. That could have been a moment . . . but that wasn’t
the moment. Instead, what we did was engage in a military campaign. . . . It’s a
way to not have a political conversation about what are we doing? What is our
sense of responsibility? What kind of reconstruction might have taken place?
We can think about collective injuries as a potential redefining moment for
who we are . . . you’ve seen Yukiko’s Koga story about the Chinese dealing with
these injuries. . . . What we have is kind of . . . a kind of erasure of the memory
[and] responsibility for what took place.
In many ways, that’s what I would say happened with 9‑11. That’s one way
to interpret that. Those are two different models of what can happen. Thinking
politically about how we deal with mass trauma, mass injury, trauma that causes
injuries.
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Thinking about collective injury invites us to raise some questions of a
different scale in significance than just individual injury. Both of them provide an
opportunity for raising issues of structural inequality, gender race relations,
ethnic relations, religious religion, and so forth.
...
Two things. The value of a comparative to cross-national and cross-regional
and cross-temporal. . . . types of stud[ies] when we’re looking at how these issues
play out. . . .
The other thing that I would mention . . . is . . . [that] increasingly we need to
think about the . . . national law, primarily secular law. . . . [and] its intersection
with religious law, often in separate legal systems within the nation’s state. . . .
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